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CHAPTER I 
I NPORTANCE OF \rJAGE AND EMPLOYiviENT GUARANTEES 
\>/age and employment guarantees have appeared un-
der the title of guaranteed annual \·Jage plans in most of 
the literature concerning them. Whatever term is used, the 
concept of employer assurance of part or all of a yearts 
work or wages to his employees has far-reaching implicat ions . 
It affects not only the primary parties, employer and em-
ployee, but includes the general public also. A bilateral 
situation exists here as it does with most important l abor 
demands. The guarantee plans are important to labor, mana ge-
ment and the public; but these groups also have an effect up-
on the guarantees. Any agreement betvJeen labor and mana ge-
ment must pass the test of public acceptance before its sur -
. vival is assured. Because of the pressure generated by labor 
in the last ten years, the guaranteed annual wage has become 
a national issue. An analysis of the outstanding reasons 
\vhy guarantee plans are important seems justified. 
A. Importance to Labor. 
It appears elementary to say that the objective 
of plans guaranteeing work or wages is the reduction or 
elimination of unemployment. Hm-.rever, when this objective is 
clearly stated, it seems to the casual observer that this is 
an issue \vhich deserves the unanimous support of all labor 
organizations. The facts do not verify this conclusion. 
5. 
Obviously, there is an explanation for the di vergent opinion, 
and the answer lies with the leaders of labor. 
This nation's e.conomy has had a limited experience 
with guarantee plans, but the opinion of those unionists who 
have worked with guarantees may shed light on the reasons be-
hind the over-all union attitude toward guarantees. 
1. Attitudes of Unions Having Guarantees. 
In 1945, The Bureau of Labor s:tatistics reported 
that in a study of over 6,500 agreements, in existence 
on January first, only 42,500 workers out of 8,ooo,ooo 
were covered by union agre~ments providing guarantees. * 
The guarantee agreement which has received most atten-
tion is that which exists between local 9 of the United 
Packinghouse Workers of America and George A. Hormel & 
Co. The attitude of the president of Local 9 toward the 
Harmel Plan was expressed in the February 1951 issue of 
Personnel Journal. 
Local president, Frank Schultz indicated that members 
were extremely satisfied with the plan. He pointed out 
that workers felt they were being well treated and were 
happy about the production incentive and profit sharing 
aspects of their agreement as well as their wage guaran-
tees. Mr. S~hultz also stated that the guaranteed income 
gave the workers greater security, allowed them to plan 
6. 
ahead and made them better credit risks in their community.** 
* 3, pp. 325-330 
** 32, pp. 1-3 
The potential problem of worker apathy towards the union 
had not been realized in spite of great satisfaction 
with the company. 
A. D. H. Kaplan in a study for the Brookings Insti-
tution states the following: 
"Labor leaders in plants that have already adopted 
some scheme of wage stabilization appear to have fewer 
qualmsabout the annual wage as a depressant on union 
activity than do labor leaders who have not been a party 
to such agreements."* 
The result of labor-management co-operation on the 
guarantee plan of the Nunn-Bush Shoe Company has been a 
higher average rate of pay for their employees than has 
generally prevailed in the industry. The spirit of co-
operation is a necessary element in successful operation 
of guarantee plans, but it is natural that labor leaders 
should feel hesitant about guarantees. A satisfied em-
ployee makes a poor union risk because of his reluctance 
to strike. The general experience has been fewer strikes 
where guarantees prevail, but not because of employee 
complacency. 
2. Attitude of Unions Not having Guarantees. 
The prevailing opinion of those unions who have not 
* 2, pp. 43 
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worked under a guarantee seems to run from outright en-
dorsement to almost complete indifference. This point 
is • . ;ell stated by Kaplan. * 
a. Industrial Unions' Attitude. 
The president of the CIO, Walter Reuther, is 
one of the foremost advocates of guarantee programs. 
Whenever the guaranteed annual wage has been dis-
cussed recently, it has usually been related to the 
CIO. The affiliates of the CIO who have been close-
ly associated with demands for a guarantee of annual 
wages are the S;teelworkers, the Autoworkers, the 
Electrical Workers .and Shipbuilding W.brkers. How-
ever, opinion on guarantee plans is divided in the 
CIO. Some affiliates are more concerned with the 
. problems and situations in their own industry than 
they are with proposed guarantees. Examples may 
be found in the textile and garment industries. 
In these industries a gua r anteed annual wage would 
be a welcome accomplishment, but other problems 
such as seasonal and style trends, company sol-
vency, and wage structures take precedent in the 
minds of the workers. 
b. Trade Unions' Attitude. 
S.ince guarantee programs are usually associated 
with make-work programs and work sharing devices, 
* 2, pp. 13-48 
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the trade unions cannot agree to their adoption. 
Guaranteed wages would mean shifting workers from 
one skill to another for steady employment . These 
unions feel that any guarantee programs would be 
obtained at the expense of past wage gains. 
Another reason for their reluctance lies in the 
fact that many of their industries are seasonal 
in nature, such as the construction industry. 
They feel that any guarantee of work or wages is 
currently impossible. Therefore, they prefer to 
sympathetically favor the principle of the "guar-
anteed annual wage". 
c. Attitude of Others. 
The opinion of unions that are not wholly the 
industrial type or not wholly the craft type seems 
to be divided, with particular regard for the na-
ture of the industry involved. The unions in in-
dustries where the guarantees appear feasible are 
generally in support of them. Where no great 
fluctuation exists in the market, a.s in the meat 
pack!ng industry; the unions appear more favorably 
inclined toward guarantees. Where skill and local 
problems predominate, the attitude is less favorable 
and probably will remain so until it appears that 
guarantee plans will work in their speci fic situa-
tions. 
9. 
The foregoing discussion has raised some 
points which would be well to emphasize before pass-
ing on. First, the fear of guarantee plans because 
of possible worker apathy has not been realized 
in experience. Second, the attitude of those unions 
not having guarantees varies with the possibility 
of their introduction. Unions in extremely season-
al industry feel that it would be impracticable to 
call for a wage guarantee. This view is shared by 
the craft type unions and by those unions where 
industry has faced problems peculiar to itself. A 
typical example of this would be found in the tex-
tile trades in New England. These unions are too 
concerned with maintaining wages and opposing the 
industry trend of moving to the South to seriously 
consider guarantees. 
Now that we have briefly scanned the union posi-
tion on guarantee plans, a look at the other side of labor 
fence is in order. What stand is being taken by business? 
How does a guarantee program look in their eyes? 
B~ Importance to Business. 
The problems of reducing unemployment by guarantees 
of work or wages lie largely with the businessmen of the na-
tion. Slnce reduced unemployment is a goal desired by all 
elements of the economy, any proposal which purports to have 
this objective deserves careful scrutiny by the business 
10. 
group. This has happened in the last decade. The guaran-
teed annual wage has been viewed from many sides and this 
analysis has produced a list of advantages and disadvantages 
which merit attention. 
1. Advantages of Guarantees. 
11. : 
While considering the advantages of guarantee plans, 
it should be kept in mind that the experience with actual 
plans has been limited. This may or may not qualify 
those factors listed as advantageous. It should instill 
the spirit of caution in the optimist. Before any sound 
solution for unemployment is accepted it must be care-
fully evaluated. 
a. Industrial Relations. 
The assurance of work or wages is not a union-
busting technique. Early in their history, guar-
antee plans were used by paternalistic employers. 
Labor and management now realize that these pro-
posals can promote the common interest of both. 
The management of Procter and Gamble Soap Com-
pany is enthusiastic about the success of their guar-
antee plan. They point to reduced labor turnover, 
high employee morale and smooth employee-employer 
relations as distinct benefits resulting from guar-
antees. * This opinion is seconded by the Hormel 
management and· that of the Nunn-BUsh Shoe Company. 
*4, pp. 7-18 
S'ince guarantees are being sought by unions, 
an employer should receive greater union co-
operation in their administration. However, there 
is another side to this argument. Where the guar-
antee is regarded as only the first step towards 
co-determination of company policy by labor and 
management, it is not felt that a guarantee neces-
sarily assures labor's co-operation. It may even 
provide a new area for dispute. 
b. Production. 
Because guarantee plans have, by experience, 
been tied with production incentive plans and 
other concepts designed to stimulate out-put, it 
is difficult to isolate the effects of the guar-
antee itself. A.. cautious statement, such as that 
found in a report for the American Management 
Association prepared by Ernest Dale, seems ap-
propriate. 
"An increase in the workers' feeling of 
security helps to reduce strain and worry 
and may create a frame of mind conducive to 
increased output." * 
12. 
It is held by some that the introduction of a 
guarantee would lessen resistance to technological ad-
* 30, pp. 30 
vance and reduce the tendency toward slow-ups and 
restricted outputs. 
c. Costs. 
The introduction of a guarantee plan has re-
duced labor turnover in those companies who have 
worked with it. BBnefits were reduced hiring and 
training costs to the employer. Because a success-
ful guarantee program involves stabilizing output, 
cost reduction would accrue from more efficient op-
erations. The number of sales needed will use less 
capital, less machinery and less plant area. in a 
stabilized business than in one having great sales 
and production fluctuations. This would tend to re-
duce per unit overhead cost. 
d. Public Relations. 
A. successful guarantee would promote good will. 
13. 
It would make the business offering it, a better em-
ployment prospect for job-seekers. It would raise 
the prestige of the firm. These are intangible as-
sets but should not be ignored in a complete analysis 
of the benefits of guarantees. 
2. Disadvantages. 
The advantages of the plans for guarantee of employ-
ment or wages and their popular appeal are easy to recognize. 
Perhaps this is the reason for the volume of material cover-
ing management objections to guarantees. Most management ob~ 
jections have been based on the costs of guarantees or 
the principles involved. Complete discussion of these 
arguments must be deferred until the types and approaches 
of various plans have been fully presented. There are 
some outstanding objections which do not require great 
understanding of the form of the guarantee. It would 
be well to note them here as an explanation of how these 
proposed solutions to unemployment have been modified 
in the last decade. 
a. Guarantee Costs. 
The proposal that an employer guarantee the 
wages or employment of his ~mployees must first 
pass the test of expense. Is this a program, de-
sirable or otherwise, that can be carried by the 
sales of the firm? What effect will it have on 
th~ cost structure of the firm? What form will 
these costs take? These questions must be an-
swered first for the realistic manager and business-
man. 
1.) Fixed Labor Cost. 
The most apparent result of assuring work 
or wages, regardless of sales, is that wages 
or size of the working force are no longer vari-
able. Thus, an employer may not reduce his la-
bor costs appreciably if he encounters declin-
ing sales. This objection has been stated aptly 
in the January 1954 issue of Management Record. 
14. 
uNo one can guarantee consumer pur-
chasing patterns. In the absence of guar-
anteed income, how can industry guarantee 
wages?" * 
This argument was deemed valid and im-
portant by labor. It resulted in a modifi-
cation of their proposals as shall be seen 
later. 
2.) Administrative Costs. 
In granting a guarantee, an employer 
makes more than a mental reservation against 
lay-offs when business slackens. An agency 
within the firm is needed to administer the 
guarantee. Changes in planning, production, 
sales and finance are necessary to continued 
survival of the guarantee. The cost of these 
measures add to the total costs of the firm 
and cannot be properly evaluated in the short 
run because the benefits of such costs are, by 
' 
nature, long run benefits. However, long run 
obligations are limited by the short run de-
mand for solvency. 
3.) T_iming of Costs. 
15. 
Management spokesmen have claimed that the 
* 21, pp. 2-5, 36-39 
time when the costs of guarantees are felt 
most is just the time when reduced costs are 
most needed. In prosperous times it is easier 
to maintain a reserve fund against unemploy-
ment and easier to finance work-sharing ar-
rangements than when sales revenue is fall -
ing. In addition, payments for unemployment 
are infrequent in times of greater business 
activity and more frequent in periods of re-
duced activity. Thus, a paradox exists. 
When business can least afford it costs would 
increase, and when it would be easier to guar-
antee employment, there is little need for a 
guarantee .. 
The management argument goes beyond ob-
jection to costs and includes detrimental 
economic effects which are foreseen. 
b. Effects on the Labor Force. 
''The timing, severity and duration of cyclical 
swings can't be foreseen. The employment hazards 
arising from them are unknown and potentially un-
limited." * 
1.) Reduced Mobility. 
One of the objections raised to seniority 
* 17, pp. 1395 
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systems and fringe benefits has been that 
laid-off workers are reluctant to seek out 
another job, because they have to start at 
the bottom of the ladder and work up all 
over again. This has been a difficult situa-
tion for the person laid off and for the em-
ployers because it restricts the availability 
of labor in the area. 
For example, if John Doe is laid off by 
the ABC Company and goes to work for the XYZ 
firm, he will probably not stay with the XYZ 
firm. His reason for leaving would be fear 
of losing the benefits that he had taken so 
long to accumulate at the ABC Company. When 
work at ABC Company is available, John will 
return. It is felt that guarantees would fur-
ther restrict any inclination by John to 
travel to another area in search of a job. 
Thus, an area with a labor surplus would not 
balance off with a labor scarce area. 
2.) Resistance to New Hiring. 
The nature of the labor costs under a 
guarantee would tend to make employers re-
luctant to hire new employees. It is stated 
that most employees would attempt to reduce 
their liabilities under guarantee. They would 
17. 
refuse a sale rather than attempt to add to 
their work-force. This, it is argued, would 
have to be the attitude of a new businessman, 
and would probably be the attitude of more 
established businessmen. No matter how good 
business was, the fear that his fixed costs 
would be too great, under a guarantee, would 
restrict the businessman from hiring new work-
ers. 
c. Nature of the Business. 
* 30, PP• 35 
1.) Relation to Business Trends. 
"By far the most important factor in any 
income or employment plan is the influence of 
the business cycle or the individual firm."* 
If any obstacle is large enough to be 
singled out as the greatest deterrent to suc-
cessful operation of guarantee programs, the 
probable choice is that firms are of t en subject 
to trends and variations in sales which they 
cannot control. 
"Thus far, wage guarantees have been con-
fined largely to the service , distributive, 
and non-durable consumer-goods industries which 
are less seriously affected by cyclical fluctua-
tions in employment than are the durable 
goods industries." * 
This is the greatest limiting weakness 
of the experience thus far with guarant ees . 
It is conceded that serious effort and in-
genuity were necessary to introduce and main-
tain guarantees, but no one has been able to 
stabilize employment in those industries hav-
ing the greatest need for it. Management 
leaders feel that some steps can be taken in 
this direction, but feel that the problem is, 
for the most part, out of their control. 
Unions proposing guarantees take issue with 
this attitude. They state that as long as 
this feeling persists, no steps will be taken 
to investigate and overcome the problem. 
c. Importance to the Public. 
The final acceptance of guarantee plans rests ulti-
mately with the public. The proposals to assure income and 
employment will not launch us upon the great millenium of labor 
peace, but they are a step forward in reducing workers inse-
curity. They are not sufficient in themselves to reduce all 
unemployment, as the UAW' would be the first to admit. Since 
their beneficial effects will be felt by the public in general, 
it would be wise to consider the areas subject to possible im-
* 34, pp. 555 
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provement as a result of guarantee plans. 
~. Social Importance. 
Eased upon the experience of past guarantee pro-
grams, it seems safe to state that benefits of worker 
security through assurance of his income or his job are 
felt in two major social areas--the family and society. 
a. Family. 
If John Doe is safe in regarding his job as 
a permanent one, he and his family can plan ahead. 
This was point ed out earlier as one of the reasons 
for worker satisfaction with the Harmel plan. 
Thus the benefits of his assurance of income or em-
ployment are spread further than his immediate per-
son. He may plan with more confidence to educate 
his offspring, or to ma.ke long-term expenditures. 
20. 
The Doe home will have a more secure financ i al founda-
tion. 
It is true that the social benefits from guar-
antees may easily be exaggerated, but conservat ive 
evaluation of the social benefits should be considered 
among the advantages. k more secure wor~{E:r should 
have a more stable home. This creates a desirable 
environment for his children to live and grow in. 
b. Society. 
The depression of the Thirties has been the 
subject of many volumes of social analysis. These 
reports lead to the belief that unemployment is 
more than a problem between employer and employee. ' 
It is socially undesirable because of its effects 
not only on the current society but on the future 
citizens as well. If the guarantee of work or wages 
is successful, it deserves attention by the public. 
If its end result is detrimental, the public should 
know. In either case, it is the public who will 
eventually accept or reject the idea of guarantees. 
2. Economic Importance. 
Success or failure of guarantee plans is dependent 
upon the interaction of producers, consumers and workers. 
Any of these groups can obstruct the operation of guaran-
tees and prevent success. 
a. The Producer. 
If the objections to guarantee proposals are 
met and overcome, the producer will have to take 
active measures to stabilize his production. The 
techniques which have been explored by employers 
involve such things as educating consumers, im-
proving marketing procedures, diversifying out-
put and increasing the emphasis on plannings. 
Planning should be an over-all set of goals for the 
operations performed by the firm. This is the 
critical area of successful operation. Poor plan-
ning can devaluate the other techniques used. 
21. 
Management has claimed that demands for a guaranteed 
wage in the steel and auto industries are impossible 
because of the lack of control over changes in de-
mand for their products. They state that, by ask-
ing for a guarantee in these industries, labor is 
putting the cart before the horse. ~. wage guar-
antee can only come as a result of stabilization. * 
Labor feels that a guarantee would force management 
to seek and use stabilization measures. 
In any event, the guarantee plan will pivot 
about the producer. If management is capable, it 
will try to find the key to stabilized employment. 
b. The Consumer. 
The consumer is the variable element in our 
economy. His changes in tastes, in demand for a 
specific product or his reluctance to buy govern 
the level of business activity. The consumer in 
this sense is not the domestic consumer, but rather 
the purchaser and user of all that is produced by 
our economy. This would include governments and 
producers as well as family units. Since the demand 
for a product is the summation of demands by indi-
1 
vidual parties, stabilizing demand necessitates 
educating the consumer and penalizing him for un-
stable demand. This is an extremely difficult 
* 30, pp. 3 
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task and requires delicate treatment. Introduc-
tion of guarantees is not aimed at creating cartels, 
but they could well be the result of guarantees. 
c. The Worker. 
The third vital element to success of guaran-
tees involves the worker and his representatives. 
Co-operation with employers in work sharing and 
planning are essential. The guarantee benefits 
are felt first by the worker. It is the worker 
who stands to profit most by their success. If a 
guarantee program is tied to production, the work-
er can add immeasurably to the chances of its suc-
cess. The past experience with guarantee programs 
will shed light on this and other factors thus far 
discussed. Co-operation of labor is vital in shift-
ing workers to meet changing company needs. Work-
ers' refusal to reach agreement or to transfer could 
result in no guarantee. 
Now that a fleeting glance has been given to 
some important aspects and implications of guaran-
tee plans, it is time to see how guarantees started 
and how they have changed to date. 
23. 
CHAPTER II 
DEFINITION, TYPES, EXPERIENCE AND 
CURRENT MODIFICATIONS OF GUARANTEES 
The first chapter presented the importance of the 
concept of guarantee plans. The remaining portions of this 
study are an attempt to show what guarantees are, how they 
work, and what advantages and disadvantages are inherent in 
this approach to the solution of unemployment. Guarantee 
plans have had limited experience in American industry. A 
study in 1952 by the Bureau of Labor Statistics revealed that, 
out of nearly 2,600 agreements studied, only 184 agreements 
contained guarantee provisions of any kind. * The same study 
showed only 20 agreements, of those 184, which provided a guar-
antee on an annual basis or for a substantial part of a year. 
In spite of this fact, management of the automobile industry 
is currently faced with the threat of a strike by the auto-
workers if management refuses labor's demand for guaranteed 
wages. Regardless of the outcome of the impending dispute in 
the auto industry, the proposals for guarantees pose an issue 
which must be dealt with. The background and history of guar-
antee plans, the general characteristics of guarantees, and 
the experience with these plans provide information needed for 
analysis of their strong and weak points by management. 
A. Definition of Guarantee Plans. 
The most difficult part of any discussion of guar-
antees occurs when an attempt is made to define them. The in-
* 34, PP• 555 
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dividuality of each plan which has been tried, and the flexi-
bility of union proposals for guarantees have created a wide 
variety of plans whi ch are all lumped under the popular term 
"guaranteed annual wage". Snider implies that another reason 
for the lack of agreement springs from the fact that guaranteed 
wage means a greater management commitment in labor's eyes 
than it does to others. 
The 'guaranteed annual wage' is the popular term em-
ployed in current discussions. The term, however, means dif-
ferent things to different people. Unionists frequently use 
the term to mean a full year's wage to every employee in a 
plant or an industry. XXXX 
To others, the 'guaranteed annual wage' means an as-
surance of a definite amount of work during the year, the 
amount being less than a full year's work. * 
Before defining guarantee plans, it seems well to 
examine some of the characteristics of plans which have been 
used. There are two general types of guarantee plans. Each 
depends upon the statement of the guarantee itself. The em-
ployer may promise to pay a certain sum of wages or he may as-
sume a given number of hours of work. 
The wage guarantee gives a definite assurance of income 
and hence of employment as well, generally over a considerable 
period of time. The worker is naturally most interested in his 
future income, since this makes it possible for him to plan 
ahead. Assurance of employment merely gives him something 
which may vary between affluence and starvation. ** 
The length of time covered by the guarantee may vary 
widely. The same BLS study just referred to, reports that, of 
* 4, pp. 1 
** 30, pp. 15 
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184 a greements which were found to have guarantee provisions, 
164 agreements provided guarantees which were monthly, semi-
monthly, or weekly. Only 20 agreements had guarantees on an 
annual basis or for a substantial part of the year. * 
The eligibility of employees covered by guarantee 
has, in some cases, been restricted to a small basic crew. 
The value of such a guarantee is open to question. Both la-
bor and management spokesmen generally agree that a worth-
while guarantee plan must cover a substantial part of an em-
ployer's work force. 
The term "guarantee plan" will be used, henceforth, 
to mean any stated policy of an employer, or contract between 
him and a labor union, which assures certain wages, or hours 
26. 
of employment (at variable wages) to any group of his employees, 
for longer than half of a full working year. 
B. Types of Guarantees. 
The guarantee which the employer makes may be un-
conditional or conditional. The unconditional guarantee is an 
ideal r ather than the pattern for an actual plan. It embodies 
the following characteristics--
All employees are covered by wage and employment 
guarantee and receive their regular wages so long as is possible. 
The unconditional type of guarantee was first pro-
posed in 1944 by the United Steelworkers of America before the 
* 34, pp. 555 
War Labor Board. * It is now generally conceded to have been 
a trial balloon. _The Hormel Company plan for guaranteeing wages 
is cited as the closest example of an unconditional type of 
guarantee. 
The conditional guarantee is a limited guarantee 
of work or of wages. The limitations may be of three main 
types--the number of employees covered, the length of time 
which is guaranteed, and other specific escape clauses which 
are designed to protect the company from bankrupting itself 
to maintain the guarantee. Examples of the latter are fire, 
strikes, acts of God, and the like. 
Another type of guarantee plan which has often 
been referred to as a limited guarantee is the Wage Advance 
Plan. Under this plan, the company advances to the employees 
who a r e idle due to a shor t age of work, the difference between 
27. 
a specified company minimum pay and the pay they actually earned. 
The difference may also be between a specified number of hours 
and the hours which the employees actually worked. The advance 
is really a loan, which is repaid when the employee earns or 
works mor e than the specif i ed minimum--be it a minimum wage or 
minimum hours. 
The plan operated by the Nunn-Bush Shoe Company is 
called a Uflexible wage plan" by Dale who gives it as another 
* 30, pp. 14 
example of a conditional guarantee. * The workers covered by 
the plan share the effects of economic fluctuations in the 
price of shoes, along with the company. This plan will be 
explained in more detail later. 
c. Experience with Guarantees. 
The purpose of examining the history and experi-
ence of guarantee plans is to place the guarantee plan in its 
proper perspective. It has never been widely popular. Ex-
perience gained from all plans which have ever been intr o-
duced in this country is 'limited. It has been stated that 
the industries vJhich need a guarantee plan most are generally 
the ones who can least afford it. The types of companies and 
the industries who have guarantee plans are those who need it 
least. 
1. History of Guarantee Plans. 
The Latimer Report states--
It is true that guaranteed-wage plans have thus 
far covered an insignificant fraction of the working 
population- In terms of absolute numbers and of cov-
erage, however, they are far from insignificant. In 
January 1946, 196 guaranteed-wage plans were known to 
be in operation in the United States. They covered 
rather more than 500 different establishments and up-
wards of 60,000 employees out of a total of more than 
100,000 in the guaranteeing establishments. 
Guarantee-wage plans began more than 50 years ago 
in this country, but their adoption was not rapid un-
til after 1933. In every year but one since 1893 
there have been at least as many plans in operation at 
the end of the year as at the beginning of the year. 
The number of plans in operation declined in 1935 as 
compared with 1934 as a result of the termination of 
* 30, pp. 22-24 
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plans established under the encouragement of legisla-
tion in Wisconsin. * 
A National Industrial Conference Board Study has 
another view. 
But formal guarantees covering a year or a sub-
stantial part of.a year have not made much headway. 
In 1947 a report entitled, ttGuaranteed Wages" 
was issued by the Advisory Board of the Office of War 
Mobilization and Reconversion. It identified only a 
few plans covering some 61,000 worke·rs. But its de-
finition included all plans with a guarantee of wages 
or work of over three months to all or a defined unit 
or group of employees. These were found chiefly in 
highly stable industries or services. ** 
The Bureau of Labor Statistics report of 1952 on 
guarantee plans found the following results after 1947. 
Definite guarantees of employment or wages have 
not been incorporated in collective agreements to a 
significant extent ••••• These guarantees were generally 
very limited, and most of them provided much less than 
a full year's pay or restricted the guarantee to par-
ticular groups of workers. *** 
2. Current Plans. 
Due to the current publicity, the guarantee plans 
of the Hormel Company, the Procter and Gamble Company, 
and the Nunn-Bllsh Shoe Company are widely described. 
Each of these companies has been the subject of analy-
sis and study because of their successful operation of 
a guarantee program. Because they have succeeded with 
guarantees and because of the stature of the companies 
involved, they must be considered in any discussion of 
* 33, pp. 12 
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current guarantee plans. Their value, for the purposes 
of this study, is more historical than current. 
a. The Hormel Annual Wage Plan. 
The company pays the worker for 38 hours of 
work each week in the year, regardless of whether 
he works more or less than 38 hours. At the end 
of the year, those employees who have worked more 
than an average of 38 hours per week are paid for 
the extra hours. During a year, most employees 
actually average only about 36 hours work per 
week. * All but a few part time employees are 
covered by the plan. This business is subject to 
seasonal variations in supply and the plan allows 
the company to employ workers for more than 40 hours 
per week without paying overtime rates. The com-
pany is allowed to do this because it has qualified 
for an exemption from payment of overtime rates un-
der the Fair Labor Standards Act. Under this act, 
the employer is exempted from paying overtime if 
he has a qualified guarantee plan and does not work 
his employees for more than 2,080 hours a year, 56 
hours a week, or 12 hours a day. 
The Harmel ·company experimented with the annual 
wage plan in one department for two years before ex-
tending it to a second department. II>ur·ing the two 
years the company noted, 'The work in the depart-
ment under the annual wage increased materially'. 
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In fact, at the end of the first year, operating 
costs had been reduced 26 per cent, and in the second 
*4,pp.22 
year, a further 12 per cent. * 
The Hormel Company policy on wages is three-
fold. The components are an annual wage, a profit 
sharing plan, and a group incentive bonus. Any 
evaluation of the Hormel plan's success on the 
basis of increased production and lower costs 
must consider the effect of all parts of Hormel 1 s 
wage . policy rather than those of the annual wage 
by itself. 
b. The Procter and Gamble Plan. 
The Procter and Gamble Company guarantees to 
all but about 20 per cent of its hourly employees, 
48 weeks of work. A condition of the plan is that 
the employee must take that work which is offered 
to him, even though it may pay him a lower hourly 
rate. The board of directors has the right to re-
duce the standard hours per week to 75 per cent 
of the normally accepted standard. The simplicity 
of this plan is a basis for commending it in busi-
ness circles. ** It has been pointed out that the 
market for this company's product is stable in 
nature, and that vast changes in planning and 
marketing procedures were successfully adopted be-
fore the plan was introduced. This would not seem 
to justify labor's approach in asking for a guar-
antee as a means of assuring employer efforts to 
* 1, pp. 41 
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stabilize employment. 
c. The Nunn-EUsh Plan. 
The Nunn-Bllsh Shoe Company provides its em-
ployees with a flexible wage plan. Under this 
plan, the employee's weekly wage is a reflection 
of the wholesale prices paid for the company's 
shoes. A certain percentage of the total annual 
sales revenue is fixed as labor's share of total 
revenue. This percentage is reviewed each year. 
Labor's share of total revenue is then br oken 
down into employee shares, or differentials, 
which are the estimated annual income for each 
worker. The worker's differential is determined 
by the skill needed for his job, his output re-
cord, and the quality of his work. The workers' 
different i als are reviewed each month on the basis 
of the company's sales revenue for that month. If, 
on the basis of monthly sales revenue, the com-
pany's estimated annual sales revenue is too high 
or too low, an adjustment is made. The same per-
centage of total revenue goes to labor, but the 
actual amount varies. Thus each employee's year -
ly income estimate is raised or lowered. s~ince 
he gets, weekly, 11.52 of his estimated annual wage, 
his weekly income varies. The union is allowed to 
check the company books. All workers with two or 
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more years work share in the plan. Class A work-
ers, limited to 595, may not pe laid off. To get 
into Class A, a worker must have at least two years 
of service and be otherwise eligible. Each worker 
must maintain a reserve of 12t percent of his year-
ly differential. He is paid whether the factory 
is running or not. The reserve account is charged 
with payments made to the workers during slack 
periods. 
d. Discussion of the Plans. 
Each of the previous plans is now famous be-
cause it has been able to survive for years. The 
preliminary planning and decisions, the nature of 
the companies and their products, and the . industries 
involved are all lmportant factors vlhich enabied 
these plans to survive. 
The three outstanding examples of successfully 
operated guarantee plans give testimony of the im-
portance of all these factors. All three companies 
initiated guarantees only after considerable ~ta­
bilization of their operations had been realized. 
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The Hormel plan was applied department by department. 
Procter and Gamble went to great lengths in revising 
the previous methods of marketing their product. 
Nunn-Bush Company's plan was based on a thorough 
analysis of wages over a period of radically differ-
ent business conditions. The products, the position 
of the companies in the industry, and growth 
prospects of the companies were vital elements 
in the success of the plans. Soap and men's 
shoes can be stored for great lengths of time 
thereby allowing their manufacture for stock. 
The meatpacking industry is quite seasonal. The 
extensive use of an "extra gang", .as a buffer em-
ployee group, the development of additional skills 
for workers, and the freedom to transfer workers 
helped The Hormel Company in its success. All 
three of these companies are reflecting growth, 
thereby enabling them to assume greater labor re-
quirements. This factor places less risk upon the 
introduction of a guarantee. Perhaps the most out-
standing point which the experience of these firms 
and that of others presents is that no single plan 
has been discovered which might be applied through-
out the nation's industry. This tends to r elegate 
any management appraisal of guarantee plans, as 
such, to the academic realm. A realistic manage-
ment appraisal necessitates a narrow .field of ap-
plication for guarantee plans. However, guarantees 
may be examined on the basis of broad management 
policies for the purpose of weighing the merits of 
deeper consideration of their application. That 
is the intent of this study. 
Durable goods producers have been quick t o 
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point out the fact that almost all experience 
with plans has been in service industries and non-
durable consillner goods. The purchase of products 
is not as likely to be postponed and can be pre-
dicted with greater accuracy in these groups than 
is true in consumer durables. 
Kaplan points out another factor responsible 
for the success of guarantee programs in the Hormel, 
Procter and Gamble, and Nunn-Bush Companies. 
" ••• each of them was inaugurated by execu-
tives ardently devoted to the idea and willing to 
give the program the large amount of effort that 
its success entailed." * 
3.. D-iscontinued Plans. 
Kaplan lists some of the better-known company plans 
which were discontinued. ** 
Company 
Chemical Paper Company 
Cleveland Garment Workers 
Columbia Conserve Co. 
Crocker McElwain Co. 
Cromwell Silver Mfg. Co. 
Davison Chemical Corp. (Curtis Bay Station) 
General Electric Co. 
General Motors 
* 2, pp. 76 
** 2, pp. 75 
Industry liegan-Ended 
paper 1921-34 
women's 1921-31 
clothing 
canning 1917-42 
paper 1921-3~-
silver 1939(only) 
fertilizer 
chemicals 
& 1939-40 
lamp department 1931-38 
automobiles 1939-41 
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Com:Qan:t: Industry Began- Ended 
International Harvester Co. agricultural 
machinery 
1940-43 
Morton Salt Company sal t 1938-42 
Oneida Ltd. tableware 1940-42 
Patterson Mfg. Co .. automobile 1937-38 
batteries 
Samukand Co. ice cream 1929-34 
Stewart Paint Mfg. Co. paint 1940-42 
Wallpaper Asso. of wallpaper 1909-30 
the U.S. 
There is relatively little information about why 
guarantee plans have been abandoned. It has been difficult 
to draw many general conclusions about the causes of fail-
ure. Appendix C of the Latimer Heport is a study of fif-
teen plans which were abandoned. The results of this 
study indicate a great degree of individuality in the 
causes of abandonment. The study also pointed to the pas-
sage of Social S:ecurity and a change in legislation in the 
state of Wisconsin as additional causes of abandonment.* 
This study showed the depression as the most important 
' 
cause of failure for only one plan. Kaplan found that 
the depression contributed to the "curtailment or abandon-
ment of several annual-wage plans". The National Industrial 
c·onference Board analyzed 125 selected guarantee plans of 
varying types. They found the following results. ** 
* 33, App. c, pp. 293 
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~Bjor Cause of Discontinuance 
Union Activity and Attitudes 
Wartime Conditions 
Depressi on of Thirties 
Adoption of State Unemployme.nt 
Benefit Laws 
Employee Indifference · 
Total 
Number of ~ompanies 
9 
8 
7 
5 
3 
32 
These results indicate the latitude present in vari-
ous interpretations of guarantee plans. They are indica-
tive of the singular nature of the plans themselves and 
of the causes for their discontinuance. 
lD~. Current Modification of Guarantee Proposals. 
For the past decade, the large C.I.O. unions, par-
ticularly the steelworkers, have issued a continuing call for 
serious investigation of guarantee plans by management. Vari-
ous proposals for guarantees have been issued and modified f r om 
time to time to meet objections which were raised by management 
spokesmen. The most notable changes in union proposals have 
concerned the cost of financing plans, limitation of employer 
liability, and the relating of guarantee plans with state un-
employment benefit programs. Unions have proposed that guar-
antee plans be financed from a trust fund into which the em-
ployer would ma.ke regular contributions. They contend that 
the effect upon costs would be no greater for this type of 
financing than it would be for an increased cost of any fringe 
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benefits now granted. Labor has claimed that use of a re-
serve fund to finance the guarantee should remove the employ-
er's fear of liability. This places a limit on the resources 
behind the guarantee, and substitutes a trust fund in place of 
the employer•·s assets. The most recent modification of labor 
demands has been a proposal to integrate payments which would 
be made .from the employer-financed trust .fund with those which 
are paid as unemployment compensation by the state. The em-
ployer would pay the amount necessary to raise the worker's 
income to the same or a comparable level with that which he 
received while working. A. more complete discussion of these 
proposals, the problems which arise .from them, and the objec-
tions which have been presented by business leaders must be 
deferred until later chapters. The union and management posi-
tions will be discussed in more detail then. 
E-. Summary. 
Experience has divided the concept of guarantees 
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into two broad classes--guarantees of work, and guarantees of 
wages. Although these classes are similar, they have dissimilar 
problems in their operation. 
Individuality is a characteristic common to all guar-
antee plans. A\ttempts to classify plans on any basis other 
than their broad characteristics have been exceedingly difficult 
because of this individuality. The variations in the degree to 
which employers have been willing to commit themselves is in-
finite. The type of guarantee, the eligibility for a guaran-
tee, and the length of time which is guaranteed are variable 
elements which contribute to individuality. B~cause of its 
controversial nature and flexibility, no single definition 
has been found suitable for the literature concerning guaran-
tees. 
The limited knowledge about guarantee plans, both 
as to coverage and type of guarantee, restricts the applica-
tion of principles gained through experience of others. Each 
business is characterized by its own methods of operation, 
market characteristics, and stage of development. The concept 
of guarantee plans is so broad and so flexible that its con-
templated application must be assessed in view of an individual 
firm. The current controversy about the guarantee is a dispute 
over economic concepts and values. There is scant information 
concerning the application or contradiction of management 
principles by introduction of guarantees. 
The limited experience g~ined from guarantee plans 
seems to favor their app+ication in industries of more easily 
predictable demand. They are ones which would lend themselves 
to more successful efforts to stabilize production and demand. 
The effect of the depression upon guarantee plans 
is currently in dispute. There appears to be no clear cut an-
swer to what causes abandonment or failure of guarantees. This 
is a further indication of the limited experience and the in-
dividuality of past guarantees. 
Current developments in the controversy about guar-
antee plans appear to indicate a greater reliance upon govern-
mental assistance in solving the problem of unemployment. If 
~. 
this is a trend and continues along its present course, union 
proposals may be diverted to an attempt to raise the benefits 
allowed to unemployed workers. In view of the impending mer-
ger of the c.r.o. and A.F. of L., a continued increase in the 
pressure for guarantees may be less imminent. The contra-
dictory attitude of these two groups about guarantees would 
make a drive to increase compensation benefits a palatable com-
promise for both. 
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CHAPTER III 
FACTORS FAVORABLE TO GUARANTEES 
Previous experience with guarantee plans illustrate 
their flexibility and individuality. This both helps and hin-
ders the arguments of guarantee proponents. It is impossible 
to make a realistic management appraisal of guarantee plans 
until a specific plan is urged for a given situation. All the 
econ omic arguments must necessarily apply to the nation-wide 
effects of guarantee plans. This study is primarily concerned 
with guarantee plans as a problem which managers must face, 
and as a tool which they might someday use. It is an attempt 
to evaluate guarantee plans for management. The guarantee 
plan put forth by the U.A.W. will be examined for potent ial 
benefits and pitfalls. It will be considered as operating 
in the auto-industry in this and the succeeding chapter. This 
discussion will concern itself primarily with those factors 
inherent in the auto industry's past experience which will or 
will not lend themselves to successful operation of guarantees • 
.B€fore applying the currently proposed U .A. W.. - c. I. o. Guaran-
teed Employment Plan to various divisions of a hypothetical 
automobile company, i t is necessary to examine the background 
of this proposed plan. An evolution in the union proposals 
for guarantees has taken place in the past decade. Examination 
of the changes will provide a better understanding of some 
salient features of the plan which will be analyzed. 
l.tl. 
Whatever form the pressure for the guaranteed an-
nual wage may take, it would be a serious error for employers 
to assume that this issue can be met easily or can be turned 
aside by outright rejection. Assurance of continued employ-
ment is the central strand in the basic human desire for se-
curity and is sought by everyone, regardless of earnings 
level. * 
A. Union Arguments For Guarantees. 
Union support of guarantee plans is a relatively 
recent development in the history of guarantees. The first 
prominent link between unions and guarantee plans on a nation-
al interest level occurred in 1943, when the C.I.O. included 
guarantees in their long-range wage policy. In 1944, fur ther 
interest in this approach to employment security was raised 
when the United Steelworkers included a guarantee proposal in 
the demands which were issued to the basic steel industries 
and reviewed by the National War Labor Board. In the Hoard's 
findings a request was made to President Roosevelt for further 
study of guarantee plansa This was the initial step taken by 
the government and resulted in studies of guarantee plans by 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Advisory Board of The 
Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion. The last ten 
years have produced proposals and objections by labor and 
management representatives. These have modified the plans sub-
mitted by unions for -guaranteed wages or work. 
Union proposals for guarantees have been justified 
by three general types of argument. They may be classed as 
(1) economic, (2) moral and (3) social. 
1. Economic Argument. 
* 12, pp. 1 
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The widespread use of guarantee plans will help 
solve twin problems that stand in the way of full em-
ployment: 
1. Keeping up buying power so as to have markets. 
Families will have larger incomes and will not be afraid 
to buy what they need. 
2. Keeping down the cost of making each car, each 
tire, each ton of steel. Employers will find that it 
pays to run at higher production levels because cost 
per unit falls as volume rises. * 
Labor statements quote the staggering economic 
losses of the depression of the thirties, and the record 
of unemployment, even in prosperous years, as justifica-
tion for workers' insecurity. They point out that guar-
antee plans "in themselves will not prevent another de-
pression, but will be a step in that direction." They 
add that guarantee plans are designed to make employers 
explore the methods of stabilizing employment and to take 
positive action toward alleviating the distress of unem-
ployment. Union publications point to specific practices 
which some employers have used to stabilize operations. 
Most employers have ignored such practices, unions claim. 
It should be made clear that the actual cost of the 
plan will depend upon the degree to which management 
stabilizes employment. Theoretically, it is possible 
for the plan to cost him nothing if he both stabilizes 
employment and works full work weeks throughout the year. 
In order to reduce possible cost under this plan, 
management will have an incentive to: 
(a) Analyze the cost of sale fluctuations and at-
tempt to eliminate them. 
(b) Promote off-season selling efforts by educat-
ing customers, advertising, providing special discounts, 
' delayed billing, improving off-season service, temporary 
warehousing for customers, etc. 
(c) In order to balance sales between peaks, manu-
facturers would be encouraged to diversify production 
* 7, pp. 11 
and introduce new or different styles of their products 
during the off-season. 
(d) Build inventories as a means of leveling out 
production. 
(e) Negotiate with the union, the widest possible 
seniority base so that unequal departmental schedules 
will not result in unequal demands for the plant's labor 
force. * 
Labor states that management has not exerted suf-
ficient efforts in the directions indicated above. 
Unions take issue with the statement by management 
officials that organized labor has, in the past, been 
opposed to the "experience rating" aspect of unemploy-
ment benefit programs, because "unemployment is some-
thing which cannot be controlled by employers". Labor 
representatives contend that their opposition to ex-
perience rating was based on two points. They point 
out that the nation suffers a loss of wealth when a 
worker is unemployed. Money paid to him is not increas-
ing the national wealth. The philosophy behind experience 
rating is negative rather than positive. It merely en-
ables employers in industries which are already stable 
to escape payment of the employer's tax, and encourages 
those in less stable industries to resort to unscrupulous 
make-work methods which give the worker only enough work 
to prevent him from collecting unemployment benefits. 
Make-work practices keep the employer's tax low, but .fail 
to provide adequate income for the worker. 
According to union statements, the guarantee plans 
* 35, pp. 10 
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will force positive thinking and action upon the em-
ployer. They plan to introduce a guarantee which will 
cover short work weeks as well as long lay-offs, there-
by denying the employer an opportunity to escape payment 
of unemployment benefit taxes. Guarantees will insure 
the worker that employers will take positive measures, 
because the guarantee will penalize employers for fail-
ure to stabilize employment. * 
The second objection raised against experience rat-
ing is that, in prosperous times, when funds for benefits 
should be built up in anticipation of future recessions, 
the employers pay less into the fund than in times of 
prolonged idleness. This failure to provide more funds 
in times of prosperity constitutes a hazard. Labor feels 
that the funds would prove inadequate to alleviate the 
prolonged distress which a depression would bring. Guar-
antee plans would eliminate the hazard and encourage a 
larger state reserve fund. 
2. Moral Argument. 
It is our view that the purpose for which an economy 
is organized is not to create goods and make profits, but 
essentially to fill the material needs of all the people. 
The only goal that gives economic purpose and meaning is 
the service of human needs. A, sound and moral economy 
must serve all of the people; it must meet their needs 
to eat regularly, to be clothed and to be housed. It 
must provide them with the economic bases .on which they 
can build a life with security and dignity. ** 
This is why labor seeks a solution to unemployment. 
* 10~ pp. 2 
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They point out that bond-holders have security of in-
come. Management and white collar workers have almost 
complete security of income for a long period and "risk-
takers" are not really taking a risk at all. Reference 
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is made to the alleged practice of putting aside a re-
serve which (regardless of what it is called) eventually 
finds its way into earned surplus. This surplus is used, 
in poor years, to maintain dividends. A comparison be-
tween the worker's dependence upon his wage for sustenance 
and the stockholders' dependence upon dividends to main-
tain his family budget is made by unions. They state 
that few, if any, stockholders are as dependent upon di-
vidend payments as the worker is upon his regular pay. 
This argument is summed up by unions who say that they 
are not asking business for something which is not already 
given to others. Guarantee plans will "give the worker a 
break". Walter Reuther, leading spokesman for guarantee 
plans and President of the c.r.o. and the U.A.W., said 
this in his annual report to the Fifteenth Annual Conven-
tion of the c.r.o. 
W.e are not proposing guarantees on an hourly rate 
in order to bring about equity---(of income distribution) 
•••• What we are proposing is that the working people of 
America, who have to live by the year and eat by the year, 
ought to be paid by the year, just as the corporation 
executives of America are paid by the year in American in-
dustry. * 
3. Social Argument. 
Union arguments for guarantees relate the unemployed 
* 24, pp. 
worker to the community. Unemployment is detrimental 
to the fellow citizens of those unemployed. The com-
munity must absorb at least part of the cost of his 
idleness through taxes and restricted credit. The 
community must also suffer the losses whi~h result from 
financial instability in the home. A worker's child 
having poor health is a debt which the community pays 
in terms of public relief, or in the loss of future man-
power. Labor claims that steady buying power will be 
increased by guarantees. "Steady buying power 11 , they 
claim, will increase the markets available to business, 
make better credit risks of workers under the plans, and 
produce more security in the homes and in the community. 
An improved community will result from guarantees, and 
that means a stronger more secure nation. 
Eh Union Proposals for Guarantees. 
Two major affiliates of the C.I.O. have been public-
ly demanding guarantee plans in mass production industries. 
The United Sxeelworkers unsuccessfully sought a guarantee in 
1944 and again in 1954. The United Autoworkers have recently 
released details of the U .A .• W. Guaranteed Employment Plan which 
they intend to ask for in mid-1955. In the decade which elapsed 
between the first and second request for a guarantee by the 
Steelworkers, a great deal of discussion by economists and 
spokesmen from labor and management occurred. Out of these 
discussions and the various studies and reports made, there 
came three significant changes in the type of proposal fostered 
by labor men. The changes involved employer liability, method 
of financing guarantees, and integration of guarantees with 
state unemploJ~ent programs. 
1. The St eelwor ker Proposal in 1944. 
In their original proposal for a guarantee, the 
Steelworkers asked for a minimum weekly wage which would 
be effective for two years, the life of the contract. 
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The minimum wage would be equal to forty times the aver a ge 
s t raight time hourly pay which a worker had rece ived t he 
year before. The company would be required to pay t his 
minimum wage each week whether it was able to offer work 
to the employee or not. The plan was not to affec t over -
time payments, which were to be paid for all hour s over 
for t y a weekw All employees were covered by the ·pr oposa l. 
The dispute was placed before the National War Labor 
Board which refused the union demand. The N. W.L.B. f el t 
t hat this demand would place too great a financial bur-
den on the companies. The Board also felt that further 
study should be made of existing and past guarantees. 
It felt that too little was then known about the effe cts 
and operation of guarantees. As a result of this r eport, 
a study was made by the Office of War Mobilization and 
Reconversion. The report of these findings is popular l y 
lmown as the Latimer Report. This report suggested, 
among other things, three major changes in guar antee 
proposals. 
2. Subsequent Modifications. 
In 1954, the Steelworkers' demand for a guarantee 
asked for a minimum weekly wage of only 30 hours a week 
at the employee's standard hourly rate. The change to 
standard hourly rate eliminated the requirement of pay-
ments · for overtime and shift premiums. Employees cov-
ered by the plan were required to have three years of 
eligibility. The guarantee life was fifty-two weeks in-
stead of two years. The major change was that employer 
liability under the guarantee was limited to a fund, 
which was to be created by employer contributions. The 
method of financing was to be on a pay-as-you-go basis 
into the fund. 
Section 72. Contributions to Unemployment Benefit 
Trust Fund. 
The company shall pay into a trust fund, for each 
hour worked by an employee in a twelve month period be-
gining ~ngust 1, 1953, •••••••••.•.•••• cents. * 
A figure of 6.5 - 7.5 cents was the estimated net 
cost of financing the guarantee. This estimate was 
made for the Steelworkers by Murray Latimer. He as-
sumed that the guarantee cost would be reduced by inte-
gration of the company guarantee with state unemployment 
benefit programs. 
With an integrated plan, the amount which the em-
ployer would be required to pay a laid-off worker would 
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be reduced in accordance with the unemployment compen-
sation which the worker received. Steelworkers are re-
ported to have admitted a two-fold motive for this modi-
fication of their demands. They were attempting to gain 
employer support of demands to increase unemployment 
benefits and to reduce the cost figure for their pro-
posed guarantee. This proposal was rejected by the steel 
industries. 
3. The U • .A .• W. - C.I.O. Guaranteed Employment Plan. 
The 1953 convention of the U.A.W. unanimously ap-
proved the proposal of the officers that the guaranteed 
annual wage be the 'next forward step.' 
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The general ·principles endorsed by delegates were 
as follows: 
(1) The primary goal of a guaranteed annual 
wage plan should be to stimulate management to provide 
steady full-time employment, week by week, the year round. 
(2) Guaranteed annual wage payments should be 
made to the worker for whom management fails to provide 
work in amounts sufficient to insure take-home pay ade-
quate to maintain the living standards which the worker 
and his family enjoyed while fully employed. 
(3) All workers should be guaranteed employment 
or guarantee payments from the time they acquire seniority. 
The guarantee should assure protection against a full 
year of layoff for all eligible workers and for shorter 
periods on a graduated basis for those who have not worked 
the minimum qualifying period. 
(4) Guarantee payments should be integra ted w.i th 
state unemployment compensation benefits so that employers 
can reduce their liabilities by effectively working to-
ward the improvement of the state laws. 
(5) The plan should be administered by a Joint 
Board of Administration having equal representation from 
the Union and from management, with an impartial chair-
man to break deadlocks. Decisions of the Joint Board 
with respect to eligibility and disqualification should 
be made independently of the decision made by state 
agencies with regard to unemployment compensation. 
(6) Financing should combine pay as you go, 
to provide employers with incentives to stabilize em-
ployment, with a reserve trust fund to meet abnormal 
costs. Provision should be made for reinsurance to 
reduce the size of the required reserves and to spread 
the risks of abnormal unemployment over the widest 
possible area of the economy. * 
The United Autoworkers have recently released the 
details of their proposed guarantee plan. It is called 
the U.A.W. Guaranteed Employment Plan. Union publica-
tions stress the fact that it is guaranteed employment 
which is sought. However, the plan does not call for 
a flexible wage with certain hours fixed as ·other em-
ployment guarantees have. The Guaranteed Employment 
Plan has been designed to fulfill the goals previously 
set forth at the 1953 convention of the U.A.W. 
a. The Guarantee. 
The guarantee is aimed at providing an incen-
tive for employers to maintain employment through 
stabilization techniques and accurate planning. 
The employer will pay all costs of the plan to as-
sure his incentive to stabilize. The Gu~rantee 
protection includes lay-offs due to short work-
weeks and prolonged lay-offs. In this respect it 
is aimed at low seniority workers as well as those 
with high seniority. The guarantee is not exchanged 
* 6, pp. 75 . 
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for overtime and shift premiums. They will be 
paid as usual. 
b. Eligibility or Coverage. 
All workers are guaranteed 40 hours of work 
per week under the plan--this includes probation-
ary workers. If the employer offers less than 40 
hours of work to any employee, he will still have 
to pay for a full work week. This is the first of 
two phases of the guarantee. The second phase guar-
antees to those employees who have gained seniority 
that they shall be paid for a full week, or longer, 
lay-off. The payments to the worker are made on 
the basis of three factors--the amount of time since 
he reached seniority, the number of payments which 
have been made to him for full week lay-offs. Af-
ter a worker reaches seniority, he acquires one 
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week of guaranteed employment, at his regular wage, 
for every two weeks which he works. The worker is 
eligible, within the limits of the plan, unless he 
refuses suitable work which the employer or the State 
Employment s:ervice offers. A Joint Board of union 
and management representatives will decide disputes 
arising over suitable employment without regard to 
the decision made by the State Employment Service. 
If a worker gets another job, his original em-
ployer will pay the difference between his old wage 
and that which the second employer pays, if it is 
below the worker's previous wage. This payment is 
known as "make-up". Make-up-pay is designed to en-
courage the \oJOrker to seek another job. The Joint 
Board will review "suitable employment" to assure 
that make-up-pay is not used to subsidize low wages 
by other employers. 
c. Integration with Unemployment Compensation. 
The unemploy€d worker would be required to re-
gister with the State Employment s:ervice and to ac-
cept suitable employment which the Employment Ser-
vice offered to him. As was previously stated, 
the suitability of employment would be reviewed by 
the Jo i nt Board of Administration. The une~ployed 
worker would receive the difference, between his 
former wage and the amount of unemployment compen-
sation, from the guaranteeing employer. 
d. Financing Guarantees. 
The financing of the guarantee against short 
work-weeks is totally separate from the financing 
of the cost of guarantee payments to workers on 
full week lay-offs. Costs arising out of short 
work-weeks operation will not be credited against 
the employer's maximum liability for payments un-
der other parts of the plan. * 
The intent of the plan is to penalize short 
work-weeks out of current operations with the aid 
of reserves or reinsurance. Long lay-offs would 
* 10, pp. 5 
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be guaranteed by a Reserve Trust Fund. The em-
ployer would be required to pay a certain percent-
age of his "base payroll" into the fund. This 
fund would be administered by the Joint Board of 
Administration. The Reserve Fund assures furt her 
guarantee payments, after the payments already 
being made by the employer equal a specified per-
centage of his current payroll. This specified 
percentage of current payroll would be the linlit 
of the employer's liability out of cur rent oper a-
tions. The "base payroll" used to comput e employ-
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er contributions to the Reserve Fund is the highest 
number of man-hours worked by a bargaining unit 
during any one of a specified number of previous 
calendar years. Factors which might reduce the Fund, 
other than a smaller base-payroll, are--increased 
benefits from unemployment compensation, reinsurance 
of the Reserve Fund, and annual review of the re-
quirements of the Fund by the Joint Board. 
The best way to explain the operation of the 
plan is by a simple illustration. Assume that a 
guaranteeing employer hires two employees at dif-
ferent times. The first, a probationary employee, 
is laid off in the middle of the week. He will 
receive pay for that week as if he had worked a 
full forty hour week. BUt if he is not recalled 
the next week, he receives nothing. The second 
employee bad achieved seniority a month ago. He 
is also laid off in the middle of the week. He 
will be paid for a full forty hours and, because 
of his seniority, will be entitled to guarantee 
payments equal to forty hours for the next two 
weeks. If he had reached seniority two years ago, 
he would be eligible for 52 weekly guarantee pay-
ments, if not offered suitable work for that long. 
The employer payments can be illustrated in 
a similar manner. Assnme his ''contribution rate" 
for the Reserve Fund is two percent. His current 
average straight-time hourly wage payments are two 
dollars. Assume also that he has five employees. 
His base payroll is determined by that year, of the 
previous three, in which be offered the greatest 
number of hours of work. His employment record 
is---
1954 
1953 
1,800 hours worked 
1,950 hours worked 
1952 1,900 hours worked 
Since 1953 had the highest number of hours 
worked, 1,950 times $2.00 gives a base payroll of 
$3,900. The employer's contribution to the Fund 
would be 2 percent of this, or $78. 
There are other ramifications of this plan 
with which this study has not dealt because they 
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will not affect the operation of the plan or its 
cost. Now that the elements of the plan have 
been revealed, it can be examined from the stand-
point of operations and characteristics of the 
auto industry which determine the plan's feasibil-
ity. What aspects of the plan or of the industry 
itself would prevent or seriously impair operation 
of a guarantee? They can best be exposed by ex-
amining the various major functions of a hypothetical 
company within the auto industry. 
c. Factors Favorable to Guarantees in an Automobile Company. 
Is such a plan feasible? Some partial and limited 
form of G.k.W. is just as feasible as any other system of set-
ting aside certain funds for certain purposes, as a part of 
fixed overhead ••• 
The auto companies, which are expected to oppose 
G.A.W., express fears that it might 'bankrupt' them and is 
another step toward 'socialism'. S~milar cries were raised 
against pensions and proved false. Not only did pensions 
prove perfectly feasible, but the rapidly growing corporate 
pension funds--now totaling $19 billion and rising at the rate 
of $2 billion a year--have become one of industry's biggest 
sources of new growth capital, and as such are a strong tim-
ber shoring up the boom. But that does not mean that industry 
can afford what Reuther is demanding. 
The main point to bear in mind on this issue is that 
G.A.W., like any other fund, is primarily a question of cost. 
Every union leader knows that in any given year the total 
amount of wage boosts which can be gotten from any industry 
has a ceiling ••••• * 
This is one cursory view of the feasibility of guar-
antees. Another view regarding the possibility of integrat-
ing guarantee plans with unemployment compensation is offered 
* 19, pp. 49 
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in the January '55 issue of Fortune Magazine by Paul Raushenbush, 
director of the Wi sconsin Unemployment Compensation Department. 
Raushenbush pointed out that the unemployment-
insurance law could be amended to permit workers laid off by 
individual companies to draw higher benefits over a specified 
period of time. Thi s would also obviate the need for t wo re-
serve funds: the existing state administered reserve and an 
employer-union wage fund. It would require, he estimated, a 
reserve ratio of 8 percent of the annual payroll, or two to 
three times the present unemployment insurance contributions, 
to carry such a fund. * 
Both of these comments point to the necessity of 
assuming. that any guarantee which resulted from a collective 
a greement would have to be a realistic cost figure which could 
be carried by the firm or industry. The design of the U.A.W. 
Guaranteed Employment plan enables it to slide down and be-
come less costly to the employer in the event of a prolonged 
business contraction. The acid test of its flexibility can 
only occur in practice. If it proves flexible enough, the 
guarantee plan will become just another fringe benefit in the 
employer's wage structure. It would be a cost which he might 
reduce by successful operation of stabilization techniques. 
1. Sales Factors. 
In order to maintain regular production and employ-
ment, in the face of fluctuating sales, it is necessary 
to create some form of buffer or shock absorber between 
the two. A second approach to the problem has also been 
taken by manufacturers. They have attempted to create 
off-season demand for a product and thereby influence 
* 18, pp. 47-50 
the sales fluctuations directly. 
The sales organizat i on of automobile manufacturer 
offers him some advantages which make stabilization 
easier in this industry. The manufacturer deals direc t -
ly with the retailer and has a stronger control over the 
retailer than is t r ue in other industries. The contracts 
between automobile dealer s and manufacturers regulate 
the sa les and the product rigidly. This close control 
will be advantageous in the event that guarantee plans 
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are adopted by manufacturers. The analytical and re-
search facilities in the company itself are highly trained. 
The financial resources which they command are greater 
than perhaps any other industry. The auto industry is 
characterized by style and advertising competition r ather 
than by price cutting. To maintain sales, a manufactur-
er is required to commit himself to high sales expense 
in advertising and styling. This cannot be done without 
a high grade sales organization. 
The market of the automobile industry is often re-
ferred to as conservative. This remark is meant to in-
fer that, because the purchase of an automobile is post-
ponable, the seller must proceed very cautiously with 
any projects which might upset market. The after-
affects of a 100-day strike on sales of Chrysler pro-
ducts are often cited as an example to prove that once 
an automobile customer is lost, he is not easily regained. 
There are certain factors present in the market itself, 
however, which tend to indicate a growing dependence 
upon the automobile. The past decade has seen an in-
crease in suburban populations. Home-owners, and busi-
nesses, alike, have created a trend of moving away from 
the cities. These groups are becoming more dependent 
upon the continued use of the automobile. The automo-
bile has also made great inroads upon the public trans-
portation services, particularly in suburban areas. 
The 3~th edition of Automobile Facts and Figures (1954) 
presents some very revealing figures concerning the in-
creased public dependence upon the automobile. 
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In a survey of forty-four selected cities, 72 per-
cent of the population of these cities travel by passenger 
car, 28 percent travel by mass transit. 
Another selected survey revealed that 85 percent 
of workers who lived ten or more miles from their jobs 
depended upon passenger cars for transporting themselves 
to work. * 
The available figures seem to point to an ever in-
creasing replacement demand for automobiles. It would 
seem that the -automobile has moved from the luxury class 
which it occupied fifteen years ago toward the class of 
semi-necessities. It has become an essential part of 
the lives of workers and the businesses they patronize. 
* 27, pp. 62-63 
If this is a trend and continues its present course, 
the automobile, as a purchase, will lose some of its 
luxury characteristics. This factor would become even 
more important as the auto industry expands with new 
markets. 
Southern use of passenger cars has doubled since 
1945, when registrations in 16 southern states and the 
District of Columbia totaled 6,213,430. Last year (1953) they hit 12 2634,063, and southern sales have 
continued to rise ln the current year. Southern new-
car sales account for a growing slice of the national 
total. Latest 1954 figures peg the southern share at 
26.2 percent. For the same period last year it was an 
even 25. * 
Since labor negotiations in the auto industry fol-
low a close pattern, the introduction of guarantee plans 
would occur at the same time in the plants of all manu-
facturers. The market for automobiles has dictated a 
need f or conformance to the rest of the industry. If 
one of the leading manufacturers succeeds in creating 
an off-season demand for his product, the entire industry 
will attempt to duplicate his efforts and there is good 
reason to assume that they may be successful . There 
will be a need for stabilization in the entire industry 
at approximately the same time. This should somewhat 
reduce manufacturer reluctance to experiment with sales 
promotions. 
The sales price of the product in this industry is 
not usually part of the competition. Competition is 
* 28, pp. 1-2 
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centered around advertising and styling. Because of 
its characteristics, the Guaranteed Employment plan 
offers a competitor a chance to reduce his guarantee 
costs by stabilization measures. This would not be 
reflected in his selling and would enable him to capture 
a better position in the market through increased or im-
proved advertising. It might enable him to improve his 
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product styling or it might simply be realized in profits. 
The improvements in the sales function resulting 
from a guarantee plan may prove to be a long-run advantage 
to the companies in the automobile industry. The guar-
antee plans may force action which will become essential 
when automation becomes more than just a concept. Auto-
mation, or automatic factories, will place heavy responsi-
bility upon the Sales Department. It will involve large 
sunk costs for plants and equipment. While it is true 
that these costs may be deferred in a given year and met 
in a year of better sales, there is a degree of rigidity 
present in them, because of their size. They place more 
emphasis on the ne ed for continued successful selling. 
In a sense, the guarantee plans will force management 
I 
to face the problem in advance of the need. Succ-essful 
results from sales stabilization techniques will pay a 
heavy reward when automation becomes reality. 
There i s one other area in the field of sales which 
offers management an advantage in their attempts to 
stabilize. As was previously pointed out, price cut-
ting has not been a characteristic of the competition 
in the auto industry. It is relatively unknown. A 
cautious program of dealer discounts and consumer edu-
cation, though the advertising power which the auto in-
dustry controls, might have the effect of increasing off-
season sales. The postwar pricing experience of the 
Packard Company should serve ample notice of the need 
for caution in this field and the need for consumer edu-
cation to accompany price varying. 
2. Production Factors. 
More closely perhaps than for any other commodity, 
production of automobiles conforms to current sales.XXXX 
The coming of the closed car has not meant the in-
crease in fall and \"linter sales of automobiles which 
many manufacturers perhaps hoped for. It is true that 
closed models, plowed roads and cars built to run better 
in cold weather have greatly increased winter travel, 
but the majority of car owners still prefer to buy their 
new cars in the spring. * 
The problem of seasonal demand for automobiles is 
obviously not a new one. However, the need for stabil-
ization is greater at this ti~e than ever before. In 
the face of rising costs, an industry which maintains 
and pays for idle plant space and machinery to meet 
seasonal demands is called upon to pay a heavier cost 
for its inefficiency each year. Stabilization of opera-
tions becomes increasingly desirable under these circum-
stances, and the benefits to be derived from stabiliza-
* 3, pp. 256 
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tion offer greater reward. 
Mass production industries are noted for divid-
ing work to be performed into its basic elements. This 
technique has developed a high proficiency in skills of 
a narrow range. There is little interchange of employees 
from one task to another. The result of division is that 
lay-offs can occur when a company is enl~g certain 
operations. Unionization of mass production industries, 
while alleviating many problems of the worker, has been 
a contributing factor in this one. 
There is a possibility, particularly in the young-
er employees, that a man may be able to develop a second-
ary skill. This new skill would make him more versatile 
and less dependent upon a single operation in the manu-
facturing process. In order to train a man for an al-
ternative task, the closest co-operation between labor 
and management would be needed. A versatile worker is 
more valuable to both groups. Guarantee plans may pre-
sent management with an opportunity to seek labor's 
agreement on this type of issue. 
The skill, experience and resources of the produc~ 
tion phase of automobile manufacturing offer companies 
in this industry an advantage which could make stabiliza-
tion easier. The technical ability in the ranks of the 
planners, the process and tool engineers who are avail-
able to study and create stabilized operations is un-
paralleled. There is a need for more careful production 
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planning and execution. Benefits, in the form of cost 
reduction, will reward success. Introduction of guar-
antee plans will emphasize the need for continuity in 
planning and operating. The current practice of hiring 
part-time help to meet peak demands may become more ex-
pensive than advanced scheduling of work for full-time 
employees. Added emphasis on efficient operations will 
induce management to re-examine potential means of achiev-
ing stabilization. Devices which have been used in pro-
duction stabilization are simplification of the product 
line, deferring the work to be performed, semi-assembly 
for stock, and more flexible hours of work. It would 
be naive to assume that automobile management has not 
experimented with stabilization in the past, but the 
need for successful operation never reached its current 
importance .. 
3. Financial Factors. 
Much of the criticism of guarantee plans has centered 
about the cost which an employer would have to bear. 
Frequently estimates of the total payroll costs for a 
year are placed in support of the arguments unfavorable 
to guarantee plans. This type of argument is fallacious. 
It ignores the "going concern" concept which is applied 
in accounting. No enterprise which plans to continue 
in business carries its assets at the price they would 
command if the firm sold out the next day. The antici-
pation of future business existence, by management, is 
thus reflected in the value of its plants, equipment 
and inventories. However, when management spokesmen 
speak of the cost of guarantee plans, they assume that 
someday the entire work force will be laid off with a 
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full guarantee. This is a very unrealistic view. When 
employer liability is limited to a stated amount of money, 
the fluctuation in employment assumes even less importance. 
Executives of the Packard Company, which experimented 
with stabilization measures in production, have pointed 
out that increased costs resulting from the interest on 
reserves needed for storage of stock are 11 ••• more than 
offset by lower production costs, by contentment of ••• 
employees, by their zeal and loyalty and by lessening 
the turn-over in labor, which is always expensive." * 
The successful operation of a guarantee plan is 
aimed at saving the employer money. Its goal is in-
creased efficiency with the threat of financial penalty 
for failure to achieve success. Those steps to increase 
stabilization, which were rejected in the past, will 
have to be reviewed. Their cost may not seem great 
when compared with the potential savings resulting from 
a guarantee plan. 
The profit position of the automobile industry is 
currentl~ better and shows better prospect for the future 
* 3, pp. 266 
than at any time in its history. The following figures 
point out the reason why--record sales. 
Factory Sales From u.s. Plants 
Passenger Cars 
1951 5,338,435 
1952 4,320,794 
1953 6,116,948 
Motor Trucks and BUses 
1951 1,426,828 
1952 1,218,165 
1953 1,206,266 
The wholesale value of passenger cars produced since 
1946 is shown in Figure I. 
These figures indicate that the costs of guarantee 
plans should currently be lower because of currently 
higher employment. They also point to the advantageous 
financial position of the industry as a whole. Lov1er 
costs and good profit prospects indicate that companies 
are in a better position to consider guarantees at this 
time. 
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The cost reductions which would accrue to the indi-
vidual firms from integration of guarantee payments with 
unemployment compensation are impossible to estimate. 
However, the two leading factors which tend to make guar-
antee plans more feasible from the viewpoint of expense 
are limited employer liability and the proposed integra-
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tion with unemployment compensation. With a limited 
liability, the employer may regard the cost of guaran-
tees as something in the nature of a fringe benefit. 
Integrating employer and state payments to unemployed 
workers further reduces the expense to the employer . 
Obviously, if the state benefi t s are more l iberal, 
every employer's taxes would be increased but that in-
crease would be shared by those employers who now pay 
a small t ax. l~ny employer s pay a small tax because 
they are in a stable industry rather than because of 
stabilization measures which they have undertaken. It 
is quite likely that they would have to share the costs 
of unemployment which t hey are now able to avoid. This 
would amount to a re-assignment of those costs so that 
the employer in an unstable industry would not be re-
quired to shoulder most of the unemployment tax burden. 
Hefore concluding the financial aspects favorable 
to guarantee plans, it should be noted that the scope 
and thoroughness of accounting methods have been well 
developed in the auto industry. This information gives 
management the ability to foresee dangerous pitfalls 
which might doom less able industries. The typical 
automobile company has more knowledge of internal and 
external factors requir ing adjustment of guarantee ex-
pense or operating policy than other manufacturers 
(in another industry) would have. The personnel are 
• 
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generally better trained and more experienced in those 
concerns which operate nationally. 
4. Staff Departments' Factors. 
Successful implementation of guarantee plans in-
volves a re-orientation in three major areas. The cus-
tomer should be made aware of what the producer is at-
tempting. The workers should be apprised of the need 
for their co-operation, and management should aim high 
in their efforts to operate under a guarantee. Half-
hearted attitudes in management or labor ranks could 
make an otherwise sound plan inoperable. 
The Personnel department of an automobile company 
has responsibility for taking measures '\vhich will help 
produce worker co-operation. Stabilization measures 
may include more training, flexible hours or increased 
use of transfers. It is nec~ssary that workers have an 
understanding of why these devices are necessary. The 
Personnel department can help avoid reluctance and 
lowered morale by an explanation of the guarantee plan, 
how it operates and how it is maintained. 
"The attitude of employees toward the company's 
annual wage plan may make or break it. The truth of 
this statement was confirmed by the experience of many 
of the pioneers of employment stabilization.ur * This is 
an important duty facing the Personnel department. It 
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requires the best ability and efforts to a chieve suc-
cess. The automobile industry has the needed talent 
and resources. It stands in an advantageous posit ion 
here as in other fields which have been discussed be-
cause of financial and man-power resources. 
Another aspect of the problems raised by guarantee 
plans which will affect the Personnel department is that 
of supplementary training of employees and an increased 
use of transfers to utilize the supplementary training. 
S'ince W:orld War II, all industries have developed an 
increased interest in training their employees. Train-
ing programs, once regarded as visionary, are proving 
to be worth many times the value invested in them. Proper 
training of employees has become a "must"1 for companies 
of the size found throughout the auto ·industry. These 
companies have developed considerable training experience 
which should prove to be an asset to them if supplement-
ary skills are to be utilized as a means to employment 
stability. 
In the field of industrial relations, introduction 
and successful operation of guarantee plans can provide 
a wider base for mutual interdependence between labor 
and management groups. The union has completely commit-
ted itself to the job of getting a guarantee as the fol-
lowing statements would indicate. Nat Weinberg, Research 
director of the U.A.W. - C.I.O. stated in 1951--
The workers of America want the guarant eed annual 
wage and they are going to get it. They will get it 
just as surely as they got pensions. If you make it 
necessary, they may acquire a lot of picket line senior-
ity before they win guarantees. But in the end you will 
come to the bargaining table, pen in hand to sign guar-
anteed wage contracts. * 
In March 1953 Walter Reuther stated in his annual 
report to the membership--
The guaranteed wage is on the way----Some of the 
gains were won from management the hard way. Other s 
came out of orderly and peaceful negotiations. That 
is the only choice remaining to management in relation 
to our guaranteed wage demand--not whether we will get 
a guaranteed annual wage but how we will get it. ** 
In view of their announced intention to strike, 
the unions hold a particularly strong card at the bar-
gaining table. Currently the auto industry is engaged 
in unusually strong competition. A long costly str ike 
could seriously impair the competitive position of any 
of the companies. The situation looks more critical in 
view of a recent report that the union is building up a 
$25 million strike fund. Thus, it may be said that the 
guarantee plans have the advantage of union support. 
This may be viewed in a broader sense than bargaining 
strength for this particular issue. The introduction 
of a guarantee plan can pave the way for an improved re-
lationship between employers and their workers. Workers 
covered by a guarantee will have reason for a greater 
* 24, pp. 62 
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interest in the successful operation of their company. 
It can be shown to them in more concrete terms that 
not only must laborts interests be served but that 
other elements are necessary to successful operation 
during heavy competition. If the information is proper-
ly handled, labor groups can absorb it and increase 
their sense of responsibility in contributing to the 
joint efforts of other interests in the firm. The guar-
antee has, in those cases where it operated successfully, 
been responsible for lower turnover in the workforce 
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and contributed to improved morale and higher output. 
Although the experience has been limited, guarantee plans 
seem to point the way toward improved industrial relations. 
The preliminary study which is necessary to manage-
ment success in operating a guarantee plan must be ex-
tremely thorough and exact. Vital factors which affect 
the decisions upon how the _plan shall operate, what its 
limitations are, what its estimated costs will be, and 
other related areas will only be revealed by competent 
analysis. The companies operating in the automobile in-
dustry have the staf f and financial a bility to undertake 
such a study. Few companies in this country could hope 
to match their ability in this area. 
Iri an industry of large, well-established firms, 
such as in automobiles, newsprint, basic steel or e1gar--
efte manufacture, there is an informed awareness of the 
over-all problems of the industry which makes for a high 
degree of discipline. The cost factors are under stand-
ard accounting, profit margins are fairly well stabilized, 
aggregate volume of the industry is regularly reported 
and price changes are orderly and relatively infrequent. 
The number of firms is small enough for a considerable 
interchange of ideas and basic data to take place. In 
these circumstances it may be presumed that while compe-
tition may be severe, it will not be pursued without 
some regard for the well being of the industry as a whole. 
The annual-wage guarantee would generate a pertinent pro-
gram, with practices adjust~d and reserves set up to meet 
recognized contingenciese * 
Before looking at the unfavorable factors from an 
industry-wide view, one other factor within the company 
itself should be noted. The size and characteristics 
of an automobile company tend to make great segments of 
the economy dependent upon it. There is a need for more 
stability in these companies as well as in the entire 
automobile. industry. The benefits of greater security 
. . 
would accrue not only to the individual and his commun-
ity,. they would also be felt in supplier industries and 
those industries dependent upon continued operation of 
individual auto companies. Examples of the latter would 
be found in insurance, export, transportation and num~r­
ous other industries. These industries would be able 
to try for more stability themselves and to plan their 
future with more assurance, if the automobile manufactur-
ers are successful in operating guarantee plans. 
D. Industry-wide Factors Favorable to Guarantees~ 
According to business economists, the nation is 
currently in a prosperity boom. Two industries are regarded 
as chiefly responsible for the boom. They are the construe-
* 2, pp. 167-168 
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tion and the automobile industries. Each of these industries 
are related to a great many different industries which are 
supported from their purchases. If this view is true, and 
the present prosperity is dependent upon their sustained 
high volume of operation, the threat of a strike in the auto-
mobile industry assumes widespread importance. Guarantee 
plans may be the key to continued industrial peace which is 
vital to the nation. Under these circumstances, the accept-
ance of a modified form of guarantee plan by industry would 
appear to be a realistic compromise of the issue. 
The bargaining position of both management and the unions 
is strong. Forecasts indicate that 1955 will be a year of 
increased strike activity in manufacturing. BY the time the 
U.A.W~ contract expires, most of this year's production will 
be finished. These indicators point out the possibility of 
a long strike. Profits are high for both the workers and 
for the companies, but the impact of a strike at this time 
could produce repercussions not only throughout the nation, 
but particularly upon the competitive positions of the com-
panies in the auto industry. Two firms currently produce 
over 75 percent of the automobile output. They are both at-
tempting to better their respective positions. Gompetition 
has been so severe that other producers have been forced to 
merge for protection. What effect proposals for guarantees 
will have on the industry falls in the realm of conjecture, 
but the prospect of a strike in any of the producer's firms 
makes acceptance of guarantee proposals look advantageous. 
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CHAPTER IV 
OBJECTIONS TO GUARANTEES 
A. Need For Employment Stabilization. 
The demand for a guaranteed annual wage has a 
strong emotional appeal to employees and the public. Un-
fortunately, neither employees nor the public in general 
understands the far-.reaching implications involved. Man-
agement has the responsibility of giving employees and the 
commm1ity a far better understanding than they now have of 
the problems of the economic risks of a guarantee. * 
Normally conservative management groups have re-
cently pointed out the value of inducing stable operations. 
The primary benefits of stability, such as savings in pur-
chases and in plant investment, reduced labor turnover and 
other overhead cost reductions, have been lauded by manage-
ment spokesman. Increased efficiency, it is claimed, should 
provide reluctant employers with sufficient incentive to at-
tempt stabilization. 
Management and labor are in accord on these two 
issues. There is a need for reducing the fluctuations in 
employment. Stabilization techniques have been used with 
success by some employers. Objections are raised by manage-
ment to labor's claims that a guarantee could force employers 
to stabilize. This, management feels, is putting the cart 
before the horse. Guarantee plans have been feasible be-
cause stabilization measures were effective. They are not 
intended to be the initial act. They are operable only be-
cause stabilization has been achieved beforehand. In each 
* 8, pp. 4 
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of the so-called "bi g three" guarantee plans, (Hormel, Nunn-
Bush, and Procter and Gamble) a thorough study of the employ-
ment pro"!Jlems was made first, and steps were then taken to 
reduce sales and production fluctuations. Employers feel 
that any plan which is negotiated to force stabilization 
would risk the jobs which were covered and the firm, itself, 
before it was lmown if stability could be realized.- Past 
experience with guarantee plans has been too limited to 
warrant their application in any but the most stable indus-
tries. Guarantee plans might give employees security and 
might induce the application of further stabilization measures 
in non-durable consumer goods. Where the purchase of the 
product can be delayed, and where the purchaser is not a 
domestic consumer, it is very unlikely that guarantees can 
promote much stability without prohibitive expense. 
B. Management Objections to Union Proposals& 
There are two major points upon which management 
bases its objections to guarantee plans. They feel that the 
cost is not justified, in many cases, and they are opposed 
to the principles involved in guarantees. · " ••• the prime 
purpose of employers in establishing a guaranteed wage is 
competitive, to keep employees and build up prestige." * 
This statement indicates one opinion of guarantee 
plans. The introduction of a guarantee does not preclude the 
possibility of employee dissatisfaction with other working 
* 13, pp. 32-33 
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conditions. A. guarantee plan may not guarantee labor-
management peace. It might cause further disagreement than 
currently exists. In view of the hazards which arise from 
guarantee costs, employers feel that the benefits from guar-
antees are too intangible to warrant their acceptance in col-
lective bargaining. 
Management rejects the arguments which labor has 
advanced in support of guarantee plans and finds that the 
proposed plans are fraught with unseen difficulties. They 
feel that guarantee plans will inevitably lead to union de-
mands for an equal voice in price, production and marketing 
policies. "Co-determination" of policy by labor and manage-
ment could lead to cartel formation in this country apd this 
would require government sanction and regulation. 
In an examination of the case against guarantee 
plans as presented by management, it seems advisable to pre-
sent the rebuttal to union arguments and then consider ob-
jections to proposed plans. 
1. Rejection of Basic Arguments. 
Union arguments for guarantees were of three types--
economic, moral, and social. Management rebuts each. 
Management claims that labor is overemphasizing 
the value of guarantee plans in the economy. Most union 
people disclaim the idea that guarantee plans, alone, are 
sufficient to prevent a depression. However, union argu-
ments imply that guarantees will promote purchasing sta-
bility on a national scale. This type of thinking ig-
nores the nebulous nature of prosperity. I t fails to 
account for the ability or inability of an employer to 
operate a guarantee. This is vital because the supply 
of work, not workers, increases gainful employment. 
Underlying the current C.I.O. approach is the 
theory that the problem of mass unemployment is the 
problem of maintaining consumer purchasing power. 
S:ince wages and salaries constitute some 65 to 70% 
of our flow of incomes, it is held or implied that if 
we guarantee this steady flow of wage and salary in-
come, the economy will become stabilized and unemploy-
ment will disappear or largely disappear. * 
Labor's argument ignores the fact that sharp econ-
omic changes are constantly occurring, even in a period 
of general prosperity. The Chamber of Commerce of the 
United States computed the decline in employment which 
occurred, from January 1951 to December 1952, in com-
panies from three industries. ** The median percentage 
decline in 45 Wood Household Furniture Companies (ex-
cluding upholstered) was 28%. (There were an equal 
number of companies in this industry which had greater 
or less declines in unemployment of production workers.) 
' In the 25 Machine T'ool Companies and 38 Agricultural 
Machinery Companies studied, t4e median percent declines 
in employment of production workers were 32% and 56% 
respectively • . These figures emphasize the fact that 
general prosperity is not complete prosperity for all. 
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There are many causes for the varying levels of 
business activity. High purchasing ability by consum-
ers is but a single part of the explanation of prosper-
ity. Other factors, such as the percentage of current 
income which is currently spent, the formation of in-
vestment capital, the sales volume of producer goods, 
the psychological feelings of optimism or pessimism 
which affect purchasing and investment, the creation of 
credit and other fiscal policies, are all responsible 
for causing prosperity. 
One of these factors deserves more than mention 
here. It is psychological aggregate of how people feel 
about the future. This element is extremely important 
to the level of future business, particularly when pur-
chasers are able to postpone investing or buying. In 
each of the other factors affecting prosperity, it is 
possible to foresee the future to a limited extent. 
This is true because the factors cannot be changed 
rapidly. However, the psychological factor may reverse 
itself in a short time. It stems from the feelings of 
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the people. It is affected by war, threat of war, the 
weather, legislation and innumerable other causes which 
cannot ,be foreseen. It is sheer folly to assume that 
guarantee plans will affect the psychology of the entire 
economy ·so strongly that the effects of wars, the weather, 
strikes, and the like, will be ruled out. It is a danger-
ous type of thinking. 
Arguments for guarantee plans also fail to account 
for the varying rates and levels of growth which dif-
ferentiate company from company and industry from in-
dustry. Would the most ardent supporter of guarantee 
plans propose that they be added to the costs of the 
declining coal industry? Is it possible for an employ-
er in the shipbuilding industry to stabilize the market 
for military or civilian vessels? Obviously, the suc-
cessful operation of guarantee programs in these in-
dustries would necessitate the intervention of the gov-
ernment. This is the underlying feeling of management 
spokesmen when they claim that universal application of 
guarantee plans would involve the country in socialism. 
The social argument for guarantees consider s the 
effect of lay-offs upon the community. It argues that 
the present money and social costs, and the loss of fQture 
social assets are strong reasons for granting assured 
employment and wages. Opponents of guarantee plans agree 
that there are cost burdens . resulting from unemployment, 
but argue that the community does not presently pay for 
unemployment compensation. · In every case, the unemploy-
ment benefits in this country are provided by employers 
through state benefit pr9grams. The guarantees proposed 
by labor will increase the costs of production and there-
by reduce the tendency to expand and the willingness to 
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hire new employees. Thus, the introduction of guaran-
tee plans will have the effect of adding to unemploy-
ment by reducing job opportunities for new and unem-
ployed workers. This is contrary to the aim of guaran-
tee plans and would thrust a burden on the community 
which it intended to remove . 
Further difficulties arising from forceful intro-
duction of guarantees would be that costs of maintain-
ing guarantees could delay new product and new process 
developments from entering the market. The costs of 
guarantee plans might not be justified by the benefits 
involved. In both cases the ultimate loss would accrue 
to the consumer and thus to society. 
The wealth of a nation consists of the end results 
of productive effort. Wages and salaries do not make 
prosperity. Their value is not inherent, but depends 
upon the amount and variety of goods and services which 
they command. Guarantee plans would pay for unproductive 
effort. S'ociety would lose by the payments vThich were 
made. 
Guarantee plans are further criticized because they 
would tend to encourage idleness. 
"The American working man is not lazy; neither is 
he stupid. Hets smart enough to figure out fast the dif-
ference between working and not working for the same, or 
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nearly the same' pay • II . o;< 
It has been proven, according to management claims, 
that where workers found it more profitable to stay off 
the job they didn't hesitate to do so. The community 
and the nation would pay heavily for guarantees which 
would in many cases put a premium on idleness and a 
penalty on work. 
The moral argument for guarantees would lead one 
to believe that the principle of assured wages is cur-
rently in effect in industry. The argument seems to 
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indicate that the workers are the only group who lack 
security. ¥~nagement takes sharp issue with this reason-
ing. Even if a guarantee plan were accepted, it is un-
likely that all workers could be covered. This dis-
crimination is unfair to the workers not covered. No 
one in business has a guaranteed market. The management, 
stockhold~rs, and creditors of a corporation are all tak-
ing the risk that their efforts and resources will be re-
turned with profit. This risk is good only as long as 
sales are maintained and expenses are covered. Guaran-
tee plans would increase the risk of doing business and 
thus make the jobs which were guaranteed less secure. 
The statement by Walter Reuther that guarantees will 
transfer the cost of unemployment 11 ••• from the backs of 
the workers on to the backs of industry .... "' ** 
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is misleading, management declares. Even the guaran-
tee would be dependent upon continued successful opera-
tion of the firm. The high operating costs of any guar-
antee would lessen .· the . ability of the firm to expand or 
contract with business fluctuations. Instead of giving 
more security to employees, a guarantee would make haz-
ards for more workers. The inflexibility which a guar-
antee causes would increase the danger of a small busi-
ness decline. The risk of failure would be greater, and 
would affect the whole work force rather than those who 
would ordinarily be laid-off. 
Management raises the issue of moral righteousness 
of guarantees. Employees are asking management to suf-
fer all the consequences of business fluctuations and 
the losses which result from these uncontrollable factors. 
Since uncertainty exists and is beyond his control, the 
businessman points out that he cannot guarantee employ-
ment when his business is not guaranteed. 
The discussion of guarantee arguments has had to be 
of a general nature because of the constantly changing 
union proposals and arguments. It is exceedingly dif-
ficult to be 11for" or ttagainst 11 guarantees unless the 
specific applicat~on for the proposed guarantee is known. 
For example, the success of the Procter and Gamble Plan 
should serve as encouragement to manufacturers of products 
having similar market and physical characteristics. It 
is another issue, however, when the Procter and Gamble 
Plan is suggested as a means of stabilizing employment 
in the heavy goods industry. Each proposed application 
and each type of plan advanced, necessitate entirely 
separate approaches. Each case is concerned with dif-
ferent principles and proceedures. 
Is work or income guaranteed? How much? Take-
home or full pay? Under what circumstances? What are 
the exceptions? -Is the guarantee suspended under acts 
of God, fire, strike among suppliers or transportation 
agencies, boycotts, war, and defense mobilization re-
quirements. And there are a host of other questions 
that can be raised. 
The guarantee plans and programs vary widely. Dif-
ferent industries, companies and plants are subjected to 
a wide range of forces affecting the degree of stability 
and instability. To make matters even more confusing, 
the power of management to overcome or off-set instabil-
ity of employment or market demand may vary from nearly 
zero to nearly 100%. * 
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The discussion of proposed guarantees is here limited 
to the 1954 demands by The Steelworkers and that plan 
currently asked for by The Autoworkers. 
2. Objections to Proposed Guarantees. 
The proposals advocated by the large c.r.o. affili-
ates involve difficulties which management criticism has 
divided into three parts. Objections concern the opera-
tion of a business with a guarantee, the problem of in-
tegrating guarantee payments with unemployment compensa-
tion, and the effects outside the business itself. 
a. Business Operation. 
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The threat of union demands for guarantee 
plans has evoked considerable discussion about 
the implications which face management when it 
bargains on the issue of guarantees. It is point-
ed out that managements who have taken steps to 
stabilize employment are being faced with a prob-
lem beyond their control. Certain factors about 
bargaining on guarantees should be pointed out. 
The guarantee would commit employers to deal with 
cyclical and seasonal fluctuations. Acceptance of 
guarantees in the contract places management on a 
one way street. They feel that once the precedent 
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of employer payments for unemployment is established, 
it will be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, 
to break. Past experience of employers with fringe 
benefits has shown that preliminary cost estimates 
have tended to be on t he low side. After the issue 
became part of the contract, labor sought and got 
modifications which made benefits more liberal and 
raised the costs to the employer. The employer's 
commitment would make him reluctant to hire new 
workers, who might increase his risks. The success-
ful operation of guarantee plans would place a burden 
on the company finances whether integration with un-
employment was possible or not. 
The increased · cost of guarantees is threatening 
~.· 
business at a particularly poor time. Since the end 
of World War II, tremendous emphasis has been placed 
upon the development of new products, new processes, 
and new marketing methods. This increased emphasis 
has made research imperative to continued success. 
The costs and risks of research are variables which re-
quire careful selection and adequate financing. The 
drain of revenues which a guarantee program would en-
tail could reduce a company's ability in research and 
development programs. The strain upon the private en-
terprise system from guarantees is poorly timed because 
of the international situation. Never in history has 
this system faced a challenge as threatening as that 
posed by Communism. Survival of our way of life is 
dependent upon a strong economy. If industry is re-
quired to shoulder all the responsibility of unemploy-
ment, it is impossible to foresee the effects upon the 
nation's future. The government is still best equipped 
to handle 1.memployment. 
Setting up a guarantee plan would require ex-
tensive study of the history of a firmts operation. 
The feasibility and requirements of a guarantee plan 
would be based upon past experience of sales, em-
ployment, production and costs. This type of study 
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would require two things. First, the costs of 
such an analysis would have to be proportionate 
to the company's ability to pay. s ·econd, a system 
of adequate records during good and bad years would 
be required, 
Practically speaking, the company had no en-
gineering, research or design departments. There 
was a primitive sales department, but it was sub-
ject to such interventions as Fordts decision--
which fortunately he reversed before the damage had 
gone too far--to open a competing Ford agency across 
the street from every existing one. Parts and sup-
plies were bought through political or personal 
favorites ••• who levied a commission on the sellers. 
There were no cost controls. Ford disliked all such 
'figure men', whom he considered unproductive drones. 
His interest in figures was limited to the arillual 
occasion when he subtracted the money paid out from 
the money taken in. * 
Proposals for guarantee plans have often been 
referred to as "another fringe benefit." This is 
not completely accurate. Other fringe benefits are 
reduced directly as the size of the payroll falls. 
In a guarantee with reserve fund contributions com-
puted on a base payroll, the cos,t is less flexible. 
A large drop in current employment would cause the 
same, if not more, expense for the employer in a 
period of ~eclining sales. · It would take a consid-
erable period of high expense before the employer 
could realize a drop in his cost. It might then be 
too late to do him any good. 
Operation of a guarantee plan would involve a 
* 20, pp. 85 
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more varied use of employees. If production for 
stock was difficult because of the nature of the 
product, a sales decline might dictate diversifi-
cation as well as maintenance projects. The em-
ployer requirements for more versatile labor would 
involve use of additional or supplementary worker 
skills. Transfers would be needed to implement 
these skills. Present union restrictions on trans-
fers is an obstacle which would have to be overcome. 
Another factor r a·ised by this approach is the de-
sirability for employers of deviating from the cur-
rent methods of work division in mass production. 
Management has often expressed the fear that 
once a guarantee plan is accepted it is likely to 
be a subject of constant union demands. Limited 
experience has displayed the necessity of co-
operation in maintaining a guarantee. If the plan 
becomes a negotiation football, it could force a 
business failure. "Where would labor stop once 
they got a guarantee?" Management feels that too 
little is now known about the various problems which 
beset the businessman. If unions and workers were 
informed of all these problems, the door to co-
determination of policy would be opened. 
As a practical matter, management questions 
the "limited liability" aspect of proposed guarantee 
programs. Suppose that payments to younger workers 
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exhaust the fund. Is the company going to be able 
to say, "that's alP'; to the workers who weren't 
laid-off until last? Management feels that this 
type of situation would result in pressure on the 
company to extend payments from current revenue. 
They feel that unions, workers and the community 
would all join to force the company into depleting 
its working capital. This would be the beginning 
of the end for the company and for free enterprise .. 
Some union spokesmen have conceded this. They 
would grant that the initial proposal is a foot-in-
the-door approach. JB'ut they insist that while 
cents-per-hour contributions may vary, the employer's 
liability is still limited to the amount in t he fund. 
This point taxes managementls credulity ••• ac-
cording to management, if it had made payments to 
lesser-service employees, it would have to continue 
them for the long-service employees~-regardless of 
the condition of the fund. The union contract 
might not require it, but good personnel administra-
tion and good human relations would. * 
The conclusion of this part of management's 
objections is based on the experience of those com-
panies operating guarantee programs. Management 
points out that one factor vital to successful op-
eration of a plan is the ability to modify it and 
bring it into line with company objectives and 
policies. A guarantee which had been negotiated 
and written into the contract with a union would 
be hard to modify. Those companies who have been 
able to modify their plans after they were in opera-
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tion are characterized by a high degree of co-
operation in labor-managene-nt relations. The 
ultimate objective of employee security is the re-
moval of distracting or obstructive elements which 
are reflected in lowered output. Successful opera-
tion of a guarantee plan does not remove all dis-
ruptive influences which prevent increased produc-
tion. On the contrary, it may bring dissatisfac-
tion by its discriminating nature. 
b. Objection to Integration Proposals. 
Murray w·. La timer, in presenting the union t s 
proposal to a panel of the Wage Htabilization Board, 
estimated that the cost would be approximately 8 
to 9 cents per man hour in the steel industry, on 
the assumption t:b..a.t the entire cost of the guarantee 
would come out of the fund. It should be not ed, 
however, that these estimates are based on assump-
tions on which there is no general agreement. Ex-
perience might demonstrate the actual cost to be 
higher. * 
Because of the strong management objections to 
the cost of financing a guarantee plan , union pro-
posals were modified to reduce the employer's lia-
bility by placing a li~it on it and a provision was 
added to integrate the payments which an employer 
might make with existing benefits from state unem-
ployment programs. This latter proposal has been 
under attack from many management groups. 
At present, management claims tr.tat ••• "state 
laws would have to be radically changed to permit 
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private supplements of jobless benefits under the ••• 
(guarantee) ••• plan.u * 
This claim is denied by labor. They claim 
that many state programs would merely requi re re-
interpretation or a new executive order. Despite 
labor's statement, management continues that supple-
mentation of unemployment compensation presents a 
set of conflicting premises. 
"A basic principle of our existing system of 
unemployment insurance is that the benefit recipi-
ent must not only be 1.vi thout work, but must also 
have suffered a wage loss." ** 
Management objects to integration because guar-
antees violate the spirit of unemployment program 
laws. They argue that integration of the two con-
cepts is more than just a violation of principles, 
but creates a situation of conflict with many dif-
ficult problems. The following lists a few of the 
problems 111hich management foresees in the proposal. 
1. Integration would encourage unemployed 
workers to take more benefits. 
2. Because of the slight differential in 
working pay over unemployment benefits many work-
ers would be encouraged to delay taking a new job. 
3. Those fringe workers who move in and out 
* 9, pp. 11 
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of the labor force would be encouraged to collect 
more benefits. Management feels that current un-
employment laws have too many loopholes which en-
courage "chiseling." Integration would magnify 
this problem. 
4. The foregoing reasons would raise the costs 
of unemployment programs to all employers. Thus, 
employers who did not have guarantee plans would, 
in effect, subsidize the guarantees of those em-
ployers who did have them. 
5. B-ecause of the '"Experience Rating": clauses 
in 30 state unemployment programs, an employer pays 
a larger tax when his workers collect unemployment 
compensation. Integration of guarantee plans with 
m1employment compensation would mean adde~ costs in 
bw ways. The employer would pay more tax, and he 
would have to pay that added tax in addition to his 
guarantee payments. Guarantee plans would not re-
duce his payments to state funds. 
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6. Integration proposals have been linked with 
statements about the possibility of re-insuring the 
employer 1' s Reserve Fund. This would be in addition 
to integrating it with unemployment compensation, 
for further cost reduction. Management feels that 
this type of financing would be unwise. It would 
lead to greater government intervention in business 
because only the government could ·prpyide .the 
funds needed. 
7. Finally, integration would raise the 
problem of discrimination. Not only would some 
employers be discriminated against at the expense 
of others, but the workers and the consumer would 
have to share his loss in the form of wages or 
prices. 
The problems above point to some of the areas 
in which management anticipates trouble if integra-
becomes a reality. Obviously, no one can foretell 
the future, and many unseen difficulties arising 
from this proposal will remain unknown until or un-
less guarantee plans are actually joined to unem-
ployment compensation. 
c. Economic Objections. 
There are a fe1.v additional management obj ec-
tions which will bear consideration. They concern 
problems outside the company. 
The result of G.A.W. (Guaranteed Annual Wage) 
would be to texport instability.' That is, the 
Detroit auto builder committed to paying workers 
52 weeks would pull parts manufacture into his'own 
Detroit plant in slack times to keep his men busy. 
He would buy from the hundreds of parts makers all 
over the country only at peak periods. Hence in-
stability merely would be passed on to others. * 
This possibility raises a problem of national 
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significance. The economy in this country is heavily 
dependent upon both the auto industry and their sup-
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pliers. The C.I.O. is largely concerned with the 
mass-production industries and the instability of 
employment which exists there. If t he auto in-
dustry accepts the union damands, the effects of 
guarantees may prove to be detrimental to a wide 
segment of the nation's business. If union efforts 
in this industry are successful, where will the 
next drive for a guarantee occur? In steel? In 
the aluminum industry? Management leaders empha-
size that this problem of guarantee demands is not 
just a company or an industry problem. It will 
create problems which affect the nation. 
The last issue of this discussion concerns 
management's worry over t he possibility of one em-
ployer paying for the employees of another. Sup-
pose that a woTker who is under guarantee is laid 
off. Suppose also that he is offered and accepts 
work from another employer. If he earns less at 
his new job than he did at his original one, the 
guaranteeing employer is required to pay the dif-
ference. Unions call it "make-up pay. 11 This situ-
ation would raise a multitude of legal and moral 
questions. For example, just who is the worker's 
employer? Does he remain an e:nployee of his orig-
inal employer, and is he only a part-time employee 
of his new employer? Management feels that this 
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aspect of guarantee plans could cause great hard-
ship for employers and employees. 
This discussion of management objections 
might provoke the question, "What is management's 
proposal? 11 The management approach to the problem 
of employment instability is not a negative one. 
As was previously stated, management has devoted 
increasing time and effort to the successful in-
troduction and development of stabilization tech-
niques. 
c. Management Efforts to Stabilize. 
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There is, of course, an inevitable link in the minds 
of many between stabilization of employment and the current 
controversy over union demands for rthe guaranteed annual wage.• 
The issues posed by the latter, however, should not be permit-
ted to obscure the overriding importance of maximum achieve-
ment of steadier jobs. Assurance of continued employment and 
uninterupted income is a central strand in the basic human de-
sire for security. This was so before the issue of 1 the guar-
anteed annual wage' arose; it will remain so in the future. * 
Management experience has indicated two main approaches 
to the problem of stabilizing. The first is to attempt to miti-
gate the sales fluctuations directly, and thereby make employ-
ment and production steadier. The second is to use some de-
vice as a buffer between fluctuating sales and steady employ-
ment. An examination of the company 1 s employment may dictate 
either of these approaches or a combined approach. Roughly, 
here is what must be done first. 
1. A study must be made to present the problem and 
its implications. This study would be of a general nature 
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and would provide information necessary to a more thorough 
analysis. 
2. An analysis of the problem in detail would be 
needed. This would involve a statistical study of the his-
tory of the firmts sales, production, and employment func-
tions. In addition to the statistics, a careful analysis of 
the product, the market and the production processes would 
be required. This latter analysis would involve careful 
scrutiny for the purpose of determining the present, imrr:inent 
and potential factors present in these areas which were favor-
able and unfavorable to stability. 
3. The problem of stabilizing has received an in-
creasing degree of management attention in the past few years . 
The material written and the experience gained by others 
should be examined for possible application in the company. 
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4. Finally, the parts of this study should be as-
sembled and evaluated by responsible management. This i s the 
point at which the ability of the firm to act would be examined. 
The objective would be to determine where stabilization might 
be applied, and which techniques would operate best. 
The devices by which management has increased the 
stability of their operations and their employment are numer-
ous. 
1. Sales Techniques • 
. In the sales field, management has found that 
stabilization techniques can be applied to the 
distribution of the product, the output, and the mar-
ket itself. Examples of those techniques which were 
used with success would include off-season promotions, 
financial inducements and modified sales arrangements. 
The off-season promotions have increased sales 
through advertising, selling contests, and dovetailing 
the introduction of new models and styles along with 
new products. 
"A rather ambitious plan illustrating this technique 
is the 'hat of the montht developed by Croft us and Knapp 
Company, makers of Dobb's hats. For 10 months of the 
year a novel felt hat is brought out and a straw ha t 
and cap in the other 2 months." * 
Financial inducements may bear directly upon t he 
price or otherwise. Experience and research have often 
shown that a continued policy of protecting the retail-
er from price change, or of postdating invoices were 
successful in maintaining sales during the normally 
dull season. 
The use of exclusive agency or franchise, although 
certain legal questions about them are not yet clear, 
have been established. The distribution of buildi ng 
materials, house furnishing, petroleum, automobiles and 
many commodities are now done through the use of this 
device. ** 
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Additional methods used to bolster off-season sales 
include warehouse service for customers, consignment 
sales, leasing, direct selling to consumer, and inte-
gration of dealers within producers' organizations. 
Product diversification, as an industrial trend, 
has seen increasing use since World War II. Certain 
industries which were expanded during the war found 
that their survival hinged on their ability to produce 
a new product or to discover a new market for their out-
put. Products with complementary selling seasons have 
been found as a means of easing the strain on highly 
seasonal business. Manufacturers have developed an 
increasing interest in products which may be stored 
without fear of loss through perishability, style change 
or other examples of obsolescence. In line with this 
trend of thinking, they must also consider the possibili-
ties of price change and the cost of storage. 
Some managements have found it advisable to ser-
vice customer orders during the slack season, and to 
perform subcontracting for other firms under a reciprocal 
agreement or on a contract basis. 
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By the use of well formulated planning, certain 
manufacturers have been able to sell to new groups with-
in their present market or to sell to different geographi-
cal areas, thus expanding their market. 
A western rubber company balances manufacture of 
car heater hose with garden hose, projecting sales a 
year ahead and using service salesmen to keep a check 
on sales trends and needs of jobbers. Employees are 
trained for more than one job and kept fully informed 
of the program. 
January sales of white goods and household furni-
ture have helped boost sales during post holiday lulls. 
Transparent adhesive tape was once used primarily 
during Christmas for holiday package wrapping, but a 
marketing campaign has developed year round uses, in-
cluding use as a handy means to remove lint from blue 
serge suits and the like. * 
There are other suggestions made by stabilization 
ad·7ocates. They advise manufacturers to take the ac-
tion within his power to avoid sales drives that create 
peaks in production, to turn from fashi:on: extremes 
\vhich would limit product demand, and to encourage 
advance customer ordering. It seems that this advice 
is realistic only to the manufacturer who has complete 
control of his market. The majority of cases would ap-
pear to demonstrate that the producer is merely foJ).m·l-
-- --- / 
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ing the market in an attempt to maintain his positign. J-
2. Production Techniques. 
" 
"The importance of production techniq ~s as method 
of stabilizing employment can hardly be overstres~ect._. f1 ** 
Some increased stability and employment can be 
realized from proper planning and scheduling of produc-
* 9' pp. 80 
** 30, PP• 78 
tion. While it is true that a large measure of suc-
cessful planning is the result of accurate forecast-
ing, planning adequately can .help to avoid costly de-
lays and shutdowns which result from other factors with-
in its scope. The following techniques have been used 
to furth er stabilize production and employment. 
1. Production for stock 
2. Off-season product ion of customer orders 
3. 1'1aintenance performed in slack periods 
Those factors which may contribute valuable aid 
to stability of production include adequate, accurate 
sales forecasting, and a high degree of line and staff 
co-operation. Another factor which mi ght be utilized 
to more advantage would be increased flexi'bility of 
work and hours through a relaxation of transfer restric-
tions and other pertinent union regulations~ 
3. Personnel Techniques. 
Competent personnel -, administration may play a vi tal 
role as liason between management and labor by pr omoting 
co-operation of these two groups for mutual benefit. In 
addition, the personnel department may perform at least 
three functions in the overall plan for stability. The 
personnel department could aid by--
1. A planned program to supplement existing em-
ployee skills. 
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2. Charting the transfer-ability of each employee on 
the basis of skill, experience, and desire to perform 
other ta ~ks . 
3. Obtaining union or employee co-operation in creat-
ing a more flexible work period for each day and each 
week. 
4. Summing Up. 
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The foregoing discussion is a quick review of 
management efforts toward stabilizing their operations. 
It is the type of thinking which currently prevails in 
management circles--not merely as part of the controversy 
concerning guarantee plans, but as a growing trend in 
industry. Time may develop the premise that these tech-
niques and concepts are the best thing to come from 
labor's demands for guarantee plans, For the purpose 
of this study, however, it represents the positive 
management approach to employment instability. 
D. Factors Unfavorable to Guarantees in an Automobile Company. 
In any study of this type, it must be emphasized 
that the answers to such sweeping questions as those posed by 
the U.A.~. guarantee cannot be made only on the basis of broad 
general characteristics as stated here. The detailed evalua-
tion which is needed can only come from a person having 
thorough knowledge of and familiarity with the problems of the 
automobile imdustry. The purpose here is to expose some of 
the broader problems which are not always considered by the 
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public and the employees, and to indicate the management 
areas affected by guarantee. 
Two factors should be kept in mind when consider-
ing those factors not favorable to guarantees in the auto 
industry. First is the question of whether the costs of 
the guarantee are such that a typical company could carry 
them through a recession. If the costs of the guarantee are 
figured on the basis of hypothetical cost reductions which 
-
might result from stabilization savings, this is an invitation 
to disaster. Second is the effect, in costs, of guarantee up-
on the companyts ability to afford stabilization experiment-
ing. Where the expense of maintaining a guarantee inhibits· 
or seriously deters company efforts toward sound stabiliz-
ing, the guarantee is causing its own failure. Even guaran-
tee advocates agree that manufacturers should resort to sta-
bilizing devices for long-term success with the plans. 
The remaining portion of this discussion will limit 
itself to general factors in major company activities which 
make guarantees appear unrealistic. 
1. Sales Factors. 
The typical automobile company has served as an 
illustration by economists and management spokesmen 
who were attempting to point out characteristic vulnera-
bility to seasonal and cyclical variations in sales. 
"More closely perhaps than for any commodity, pro-
duction of automobiles conforms to current sales."· * 
* 3, pp. 256 
The reasons for this statement are obvious when 
it is understood that manufacturers are extremely re-
luctant to store finished goods. Outstanding reasons 
expressed by management spokesmen reveal that the fol-
lowing factors are considdered serious objections to 
manufacture fo r stock. 
1. Risk of obsolescence: Today, the selling 
features of an automobile are largely dependent upon 
its styling. Storage of automobiles would subject the 
manufacturer to the risk that competitor s might steal 
his designs, or that sales of present models might de-
cline because buyers postponed buying current models 
to wait for new models. The automobile industry ha s 
frequently been criticized on the grounds that the 
growing emphasis on automobile styling is inefficient. 
This criticism claims that making the automobile a 
fashion product is costly to the industry and to the 
nation. The automobile executives reject this crit~cal 
view and point to styling as one of the major reasons 
for the record sales of recent years. 
2. Risk of Physical Damage: The possibility of 
fire, water and theft damage would create enormous insur-
ance costs which would result from a policy of manufact-
uring to stock. Since this storage does nothing to en-
hance the selling price of the product, it is claimed 
that these costs would have to be met out of profits. 
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3. High Storage Costs: The size of the product 
and the need for prot~ction from physical deterioration 
would also present management with high storage costs. 
This problem has been added to the following thought . 
Management of automobile companies claim tha t people 
who buy a new car 1>1ant it to have 11tha t new car s;nell." 
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Other problems and costs whic~ storage would create, 
together with those mentioned here, are sufficient to 
prevent auto manufacturers from adopting the guarantee 
approach for stabilization of employment. 
The following Federal Res erve Index of Automobile 
Production indicates the magnitude of change in produc-
tion caused by sales fluctuations in a year. 
t' 
Ih automobile production, the peak was reached 
during the month of April. This peak was more than 100% 
higher than the index for the following November, the 
low point for the year. 
The previous discussion indicates the degree of 
difficulty in approachin~; the problem of employmen t sta-
bility by setting up a buffer system between irregular 
sales and regular production. Another approach advocated 
by stabilization proponents would be to pass the problem 
of storage on to dealers. This possibility is also 
fraught with difficulties. The financial ability of 
dealers is more limited than that of the manufact.urer. 
If dealers were to take over the function of storing 
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more cars than they could currently sell, they would 
require assistance from the manufacturer. Such assist-
ance would be most feasible in the form of delayed bill-
ing by the manufacturer. This practice could seriously 
impair the manufacturerts working capital--particularly 
in a period of declining sales. 
Even where delayed billing \va s possible, the dealer 
would be faced with the problems and risks of storing 
automobiles. It is unreasonable to assume that the 
dealer would be in a better position to assume the risks 
and solve the problems than the manufacturer would be. 
To the contrary, local problems of storage faci l ities 
and protection would make dealer storage of stock more 
difficult. 
The problems of attempting to regularize production 
and employment seem to revolve about the ability of a 
manufacturer to make his operation more flexible by 
diversification or by greater flexibility in the working 
time. 
The difficulties of developing and selling new 
products are too extensive to devote more than cursory 
attention to now. However, the postwar experience of 
many expanded industries provides numerous examples of 
the pitfalls and hazards which a\•Jai t the manufacturers 
vJh o attempt to diversify. The sales organizations of 
the automobile industry are not trained for selling prod-
u .c.t >s unrelated to automobiles. The expense of develop-
ing a new sales organization could prevent successful 
diversification and might weaken the present sales or-
ganization by diverting funds and energy away from· it. 
The problems of diversifying and of flexible working 
hours belong largely to the production and financial 
phases of a company's operations and will be considered 
1,.1i th them. 
A final sales problem which makes guarantees less 
practicable is revealed in this part of the latest 
General Motors' report to stockholders. 
"The report laid heavy emphasis on a 29 per cent 
decline in the company's defense business. Total sales 
of military items slipped to 1,371,000,000 from the pre-
vious year t s 1, 938,000,000. tt : * 
A company which realizes a substantial part of i t s 
sales revenue in the form of government contract work 
i s in no position to stabilize employment. How will 
stabilization techniques work when the market has been 
closed? They would force diversif ication which is, at 
best, a r isky proposition. Guaranteed wages or employ-
ment for all workers \vould force manufacturers to pass 
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up this defense business and pass by the opportuni t y of 
providing more jobs. During the "Cold War, tt i this policy 
is dangerous. It might cause increased government action. 
* 16, pp . 13 
Since stabilized employment appears almost impos-
sible by use of a sales shock absorber, it seems wise 
to examine the possibility of inducing off-season sales 
through promotions and other efforts. 
It has been suggested that price reductions would 
help to alter the seasonal nature of automobile sales. 
Because of the fierce competition currently present in 
the auto industry, the merits of this proposal are ques-
tionable. Where would price cutting begin? Where would 
it end? There are so few sellers in the auto industry 
that any variation in price would be detected immediate-
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ly. Up to now, price wars have been non-existent in this 
industry. The possibility of inducing further price cut-
. . . I 
ting could make a manufacturer's business even less stable 
than it is and it would thus boomerang on guarantee plans. 
The potential success of sales contests and efforts 
to educate customers in this industry is debatable. 
The automobile purchaser is one of the most conservative 
in our economy. s:uggested reasons for this include the 
fact that the high purchase price of an automobile 
places it in competition, not only with other automobiles, 
but with such things as new home down-payments, college 
educations and house furnishings. Another reason for 
possible resistance to promotions would be that P,eople 
get more use from automobiles during the summer-: It is 
not surprising that they should want to make their 
purchase as close as possible to this season. 
Regardless of the success -of stabilization in 
other departments, a large part of the answer to wheth-
er guarantee plans will prove operable rests upon a 
company's ability t;o achieve stable sales. The pos-
sibility of success with a guarantee di minishes as the 
risks of stabilization increase. 
The U.A.W. plan seeks protection from shor t work-
weeks as well as from longer lay-offs. This cost, added 
to that of .stabilizing sales, makes the future of guar-
antees unpromising. Stabilization, in itself, is de-
sirable, but whether stable sales can be produced by 
penalizing manufacturers is questionable. 
It has been suggested that the ability of an auto-
mobi le company to guarantee work or wages would be en-
hanced by their competent sales analysts. This is un-
realistic. Their experience in sales analysis does not 
provide the answers on how to even out sales. The two 
problems are completely separate. Obviously, sales fact-
finding is not the same as planned manipulat~on, there-
fore their requirements and background differ. 
2. Production Factors. 
The introduction of guarantee plans would require 
a great deal of change in the flexibility of the firm. 
This need for flexibility would be present even if the 
sales were not subject to wide seasonal variation. In 
a typical auto industry, f l exibility policies would en-
counter two major obstacles. Mass production is based 
on great division of labor and subsequent high special-
ization. Flexibility could only be achieved by sacri-
ficing some degree of this specialization. Flexible 
production would involve flexible hours of work, the 
stepped up use of transfers and product or process di-
versification. Production planning, essential to pro-
duction stability, is based upon sales forecasting. 
Accurate forecasting reduces the problems of production 
planning and increases its efficiency. Guarantee plans 
will introduce new elements affecting the success of 
planning. Requirements necessary to maintain flexi-
bility, such as maintaining a labor pool, would hamper 
the efforts of production planners to maintain stea dy 
employment for all workers. The problem would be worse 
in declining sales periods while trying to maintain ef-
ficiency at the same time. 
Another factor unfavorable to guarantee plans is 
the reluctance of those unions demanding guarantees to 
agree to more flexible working hours or relaxed transfer 
restrictions. In the firms which have had success with 
stabilization measures, experience has indicated a need 
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for more transfers and more flexible working hours. 
Union refusal to relent on these issues place guar-
antees in an unfavorable position. 
Diversification of products and improved produc-
tion methods are advanced as one way to a successful 
guarantee operation. Indeed, there has been a grow-
ing realization of the need for and use of diversifi-
cation in the post World War II period, but the problems 
involved and the risks incurred are of great magni tude. 
s·uccess has come at a high price and failure has often 
been ruinous. 
The re-tooling for model changes adds another 
problem to be faced when attempting to stabilize em-
ployment. If the high cost of lay-offs prevent a com-
pany from reducing its payroll, when new machines are 
being installed, this new cost could inhibit the dynamic 
nature of the auto industry. The results of this re-
striction would be to limit the trend to automation 
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and the product changes which are currently an impor t -
ant part of the auto industry ·and its high current sales. 
Guarantee advocates have indicated that a policy 
of introducing new models during off-seasons would be 
assistance to manufacturers as a stabilizing device. 
This raises the question of how re-tooling at various 
intervals in the year would affect costs of changing 
models. It seems that costs should be less when the 
operation is completed in one short period. Any other 
policy would stretch out the time over which machinery 
and fixtures would be returning their costs from the 
entire model line. 
The Methods Engineering department would also be 
faced with new problems if guarantees force stabiliza-
tion upon an auto company. The problems would center 
about the introduction of supplementary training and 
its implications on methods and time studies. This is 
not meant to imply that the problems involved in sta-
bilization are insurmountable. But where stabilization 
is forced, the less important problems would grow larger 
and be more expensive. The implication inherent in 
guarantee plans is that stabilization policies would 
be a necessity and would not come slowly as the condi-
tions allowed. 
The process referred to as 11inodel changeover" is a 
characteristic which is not limited to the auto industry 
alone. However, no other industry is involved in change-
over costs which approach those facing the automobile 
manufacturer. The need for last minute changes in the 
product or process is nowhere as gr eat as in this in-
dustry. The problems arising from this are not the type 
that would lend themselves to forethought and planning •. 
The reason for this is obvi ous. The changes are dictated 
by information about competing products. The change is 
dictated by competition in the industry and past sales 
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experience when possible changes were ignored. The 
1955 models of the Oldsmobile and Nash corporations 
are an example of this point. Both companies have 
found it necessary to change their product offerings 
in less than six months. Oldsmobile has added a new 
model. Nash has altered existing models. These changes 
were dictated by sales results and point out the need 
for change to keep abreast of the competition. 
Heavy demands are placed upon production after 
the decision has been made to change. The change must 
be made, and, although the costs of change are import-
ant, the time allowed weighs heavily. The question of 
stabilized operations under these conditions is a dif-
ficult one. It can be said that this area will be 
another contributing difficulty, if union guarantee 
demands are fulfilled. 
3. Financial Factors. 
Throughout the preceding discussions, a great deal 
of emphasis has been laid upon costs which operation of 
guarantee programs would produce or upon the costs of 
forced employment stabilization measures. Rather than 
repeat that discussion here, it would be worthwhile to 
proceed to some additional areas which might give rise 
to added expense. 
The costing procedures in an automobile manufactur-
ing firm are often responsible for a large share of the 
success or failure of the company. The Chairman of the 
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Board of Directors of The Ford Motor Company, }tr. Ernest 
Breech, was quoted in a recent magazine article as fol-
lovJs--"I realized, 11 he says , "that it was here that a 
bus iness stood or fell--on cost controls. 11 * Th is 
statement as sumes greater significance in a large mass 
production firm. The effect of guarantee plans upon 
the cost standards is a large enough ar ea to j ust ify 
an ent ire study. How transfers and added training pro-
grams would affect the rates and methods now used in 
t his type of company is beyond the scope of this study .. 
But it can be stated that the philosophy which under-
lies cur rent costing methods is that of achieving maxi-
mum efficiency rather than flexibili ty . This, then, is 
another area of company operations which would require 
modifi cation under a guarantee program. The mod i fica -
tions might r esult from problems ari sing from trans-
f erred workers and reduced efficiency. It might dicta te 
an alteration of the current system of cost centers . 
~lliat ever results develop, the current set up of 
cost procedures can be assumed t o present further prob-
l ems and expenses \vhich do not encourage adopting guar -
tee plans in their present forms. 
The creation and joint administrat ion of a r es erve 
fund would be a pr imary step t oward union questions re-
gard ing sales , financial and product ion policies of the 
* 20, pp . 90 
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firm. The administration of the fund is dependent up-
on deceisions made in these areas a.nd would, unque s tion-
ably, cause point ed disagreement between the union and 
t he company. 
The size of the reserve \t.Jhich would curr ent l y be 
required to maintain an adequate guarantee would drain 
time and productive effort from the major financ i al ob-
jectives. There is not the slightest chance that e ither 
labor or management would allow any but a most re sponsi-
ble and experienced official make the decisions aff ect-
i ng a fund of this size. The costs of administrat i on 
would, at best, be shared by unions and the company. 
This has been an attempt to point out s ome salient 
issues in the financial area of company operation . 
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There are others, such as operating budgets, financial 
appraisals, and capital source studies, which might alse 
be mentioned. Each of these areas will feel the i mpact 
of a. guarantee. The combined efforts of all 1vould be 
under strain if the firm were forced to attempt stabil-
ization because of a guarantee plan. 
4. Staff Department Factors. 
Before concluding the factors unfavorable to guar-
antees some brief mention of these additional areas is 
needed. There are problems in Purchasing, Personnel, 
and Administrative areas which will be affected in the 
event that stabilization, through guarantee pressure, 
becomes reality. 
The purchasing function in a large, nationally 
established firm is based on the policy of building and 
maintaining good vendor relations. In times of short-
ages the dividends of such a policy have been realized 
by the purchasing corporations. When they are faced 
with the problem of supplying work for their employees, 
auto companies may be forced into "making" instead of 
11buyingn many of their parts. This could prove to be 
expensive in money terms and in vendor good will. It 
would seem to offer the auto manufacturer a choice of 
the least expensive alternative. Thus, he would be 
forced to refrain from buying except in periods of 
high or rising sales. What view the federal govern-
ment would take regarding this type of policy is a 
question nmv unanswered. It promises to produce a 
delicate situation at best. 
The Personnel department 'l.vould be involved in 
many issues where personal judgement would establish 
precedents. Training, transferring, transfer and ~erit 
classifications, scheduling transfers in advance, the 
use of a labor pool--all issues are potentially ex-
plosive in nature, and would require an improved griev-
ance procedure for rapiq settlement. The issues indi-
cated here, from past experience, are the type which 
could result in constant bickering and antagonism be-
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tween unions and management. 
Guarantee plans are claimed to be divisive and 
discriminatory within the working force. Based upon 
this assumption is the management belief that the Per-
sonnel department will be required to close the breech 
between workers as well as any rifts between the com-
pany and the workers. This type of administration 
will demand highly paid and extremely capable execu-
tive talent. This, again, returns to the issue of costs. 
The final point which does not favor guarantees in 
this hypothetical company is the management fear of 
excessive worker security., Many management quarters 
privately express the view that guarantee plans would 
create a ncivil Service type of complacency" in private 
enterprise. These views reflect the belief that a cer-
tain insecurity in the work force is desirable because 
it prevents slackness and indifference from developing. 
This view is offered merely as one of the elements of 
the whole argument against introducing guarantees into 
a company. It represents the type of thinking in some 
management ranks which will restrict co-operation on 
guarantee programs and increase the difficulties of 
operating in a company of the type discussed here. 
E. Other Comments on the U .A. w:. Guaranteed Employment Plan. 
In concluding the management viewpoint, thus far 
expressed about guarantee plans, there are five points of in-
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terest which merit passing notice. They are all concerned 
with the U.A.W'. Guaranteed Employment Plan. 
The first aspect concerns "make-up pay." The situ-
ation proposed by this part of the Autoworker's plan could 
create a legal Frankenstein. When two employers pay wages 
to the same worker, who is productively employed by only one 
118. 
of them, what would be the legal status of the unemployment 
payments? Would they be wages and subject to lien by a creditor, 
or would they be above the law? What liability is the guarantee-
paying employer subject to? What taxes and Social Security pay-
ments would have to be made for the employee who was working 
elsewhere? Would this quasi state-citizen relation between 
the guaranteeing employer and unemployed worker violate other 
legal precepts? Where would guarantees be, legally? Would 
they encourage a Socialistic or Communistic philosophy in 
government? 
Another point which an authoritative U.k.W. source 
states is that the plan which is currently being discussed 
has an alternate to it . This may or may not be discovered 
until the a ctual bargaining occurs. This source, which can-
not be revealed, states that if certain conditions prevent 
acceptance of the current proposal, the alternative will then 
be presented. It is claimed that the alternative plan satis-
fies the needs of the U.A.W. as set forth in their convention 
last year. The existence of a substantially modified plan 
may fail to reveal significant areas of concern at this time 
which could later weigh heavily, as an important factor in 
guarantee operations or bargaining. 
There is a question raised by union guarantee de-
mands which concerns labor-management co-operation. Union 
proposals are quite frankly based upon the theory that sta-
bilization can be forced upon employers. Proof for this line 
of thought is not to be found in previous experience with 
either guarantee or stabilization programs. Where guaran-
tees have provided incentive to stabilize, there already 
existed a certain measure of stability. In addition, the 
successful program was based upon voluntary co-operation of 
employers and unions. 
The statements issued by the U.A.W·. give the im-
pression that abnormal costs of guarantees could not arise 
from a poor sales year. The provision of the U .A. \•r. plan 
which calls for short work-weeks to be paid for as a current 
expense could represent a huge yearly cost, if sales were 
erratic or delayed. This proposal needs further clarifi-
cation and exemplification before it can be shown that guar-
antee costs are truly flexible. 
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The final point is concerned with automation. Unions 
are quite · concerned with what they call the "initial impact" 
of automation. They claim that a comprehensive guarantee 
plan would prevent management from laying off large numbers 
of workers who could not be re-absorbed by industry on such 
short notice. Although this reasoning may be partially sound 
it does not take into account the fact that widespread guar-
antee programs in the industry would aggravate this labor 
absorption problem not alleviate it. 
Now that guarantee plans, their history and their 
controversial aspects have been examined, it is time to pro-
ceed to the implications which this concept and its discuss-
ion hold for other management groups. 
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A.. S·ummary. 
CHAPTER V 
S.U1VflVlARY AND CONCLUSION 
The threat of large scale unemployment and the 
persistent r ecurrence of lay-offs during prosperity have 
combined to present American industry with the most formid-
able challenge since the advent of unionism. The implica-
tions which lie in the c.r.o. demand for a guarantee of work 
or wages pose a serious threat to management. It is true 
that the current demand for guarantees is largely confined 
to the giant mass production industries. Hut if acceptance 
of the principle of guarantees is obtained, it will only be 
a question of time before other industries will feel the im-
pact of that acceptance. Because of the infinite number of 
difficulties surrounding guarantee plan operations, it seems 
advisable for alert management to make themselves aware of 
t he problem, and keep abreast of the impending trends and 
developments concerning guarantee demands. 
1. The Problem. 
B.oth management and labor groups are increasingly 
aware of the problem of long and short period unemploy-
ment. This is not entirely a problem of employee se-
curit y. It is a reflection upon the efficiency and in-
genuity of the industry involved. The difficulties, 
however, do not arise in recognizing the problem. Here, 
as in so many other phases of management, there are al-
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ternative approaches to the solution. Management and 
labor groups agree that the use of stabilization de-
vices, as such, present the best method of attacking 
m~employment; but which techniques to use, and how to 
undertake the task are questions of interpretation. 
Both management and labor lack unity within their own 
ranks on these questions. The solution appears to lie 
in collective bargaining, but the inherent danger of 
unbalanced bargaining strength makes both groups fear-
ful to rely upon it exclusively. 
2. The Approaches Taken. 
The basic difference between management and labor 
methods of tackling the unemployment problem revolves 
about the question of guarantees. This comes back to 
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the issue of employee security • . Is a worker more se-
cure under a guarantee, with the ' risks which it involves, 
or under a planned program to stabilize operations. This 
is open to argument. If the 11feeling 11 1 of security is 
more important than the security itself, guarantees 
provide the answer. However, unions have turned to 
guarantees because they felt that such pressure was re-
quired to induce stabilization programs. This is the 
heart of the current dispute concerning guarantees. 
a. The Union Approach. 
In spite of the apparent problems, union lead-
ers feel that the best . means of promoting active 
management effort to relieve unemployment lies in 
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guarantee plans. Labor spokesmen have pointed the 
success of this type of approach in other industries. 
They feel that management has failed to take advant-
age of this experience. A system whereby an em-
ployer is penalized for failure to provide in-
creased stability, they feel, is the answer. This 
involves using the guarantee plan as ~ lever to 
force introduction and exploration of further em-
ployment stabilizing measures. 
b. The Management Approach. 
The caution exercised by management groups does 
not stem solely from the fact that guarantee plans 
are labor demands. In fact, the first guarantee 
plans were management sponsored. Because of the 
limits to which past guarantee plan experience may 
be applied and the multitude of hidden costs and 
restrictions which guarantees involve, management 
generally feels that a planned program of stabiliza-
tion has more merit. The element of force is absent, 
but the flexibility of such a program and the bene-
fits to be derived, should offer greater inducement 
and promote wider application of stability measures 
than a guarantee demand by unions. Basically, it 
is good management to stabilize where possible and 
investigate those areas where stability now looks 
improbable. 
3. Future Trends. 
The future of guarantee plans as a concept will 
depend, to a large extent, upon the next few years. 
At present, it is impossible to determine the length 
to which unions and management will go in support of 
their respective positions. The success or failure of 
the United Autoworkers' current demand for a guarantee 
plan could be a big step toward or away from the guar-
antee approach. The summer of 1955 will see other 
unions join in the demand for guarantee plans, and the 
precedent established in the auto industry could pro-
vide a pattern for these lliLions. 
The impending merger of the A.F. of L. and C.I.a. 
unions is another relevant factor in the future of the 
guarantee concept. For the most part, the issue of the 
"Guaranteed Annual Wage" has been a C.I.O. property. 
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The preponderance of craft unions within the A.F. of L. 
has prevented serious consideration of guarantee plans 
by this organization. The new "super-union", as it has 
been called, will give labor unparalleled bargaining 
strength on a national level. This strength, if thrown 
in support of guarantee plans, could go far in promoting 
their adoption. If, however, the A.F. of L. continues 
to largely ignore guarantees or to consider them im-
practical, the c.r.o. demands for a guarantee may fall 
to obscurity. 
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B. Conclusions. 
1. Evaluation of the Arguments. 
This study has been an attempt to bring to light 
the aspects of guarantee plans which would favor their 
further adoption and the serious limitations which abound 
in this method of solving employment insecurity and un-
stability. As a r esult of this study, it may be stated 
that certain values lie in either the union or manage-
ment approach which cannot be ignored by taking a "pro" 
or a "con" position in the current guarantee controversy. 
The costs and restrictions from guarantees could hardly 
be undertaken in a more worthy cause than the attempt 
to mitigate unemployment problems. The union attitude 
that some form of penalty is necessary to ensure manage-
ment efforts to stabilize is based upon the belief that 
management failed to solve the unemployment problem. 
However, the doubtful nature of successful guarantee 
plans is also important in management objections. I n 
each case where a guarantee is proposed, it is quite 
likely that certain justification exists for introducing 
or rejecting guarantee plans. The solution of the prob-
lems arising from guarantee demands may rest in evaluat-
ing both, and selecting one approach, or it may i nvolve 
compromise by both parties. 
2. Conclusions Drawn. 
The following are the conclusions reached by this 
study. 
a. The possible types of guarantee plans is in-
finite. Although the term "guarantee" is common 
to almost all of them, the plans included under 
this heading may contain a very strict guarantee, 
a very loose guarantee, or one of the many possi-
bilities between these two extremes. The t yp e of 
thinking promoted by past economic studies of the 
guarantee concept--that they are good or bad for 
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the nation--fails to recognize the complete indi-
viduality of every plan and the unique charac t er is-
tics with which it must deal on a company or on in-
dustry level. A completely general di s cus sion of 
the ec onoNic concept of guarantees will hold limited 
value for individual management. Guarantee demands , 
at this time, must be faced entirely on tre l ocal 
issues involved. This situation is a res :~.lt of the 
limited past experience with guar ant ees and extreme 
flexibility of proposed guarantees. It will remain 
so until or unless more varied experience is avail-
able concerning guarant ee op er-ations on a larger scale. 
b. Previously applied guarantees have been selec-
tive in nature and have generally contained extensive 
"escape clauses "; for t he employer. If the onl y f a ctor 
which coul d recommend guarantee plans was the fa c t 
that t hey had been successful in some indus t ries, 
it is quite likely that they would never succeed 
on a national scale. The past experience with 
guarantees has been almost entirely inapplicable 
to durable goods industries. The physical char-
acteristics of the product and the buying habits 
in the market have lended themselves to operation 
of a guarantee with less difficulty than can pos-
sibly be foreseen for those industries currently 
faced with guarantee demands. The current guar-
antee demands by C.I.O. affiliates are not occur-
ring in industries which can apply the specific 
past experience of successful guarantee operators. 
c. The economic arguments advanced in support of 
and in opposition to guarantee demands tend to ar-
rive at conclusions which are not substantially sup-
ported by \>Jeighty factual evidence. This is due, 
primarily, to the natural limitations of previous 
guarantee plans and the difficulties involved in 
generalizing from intensive rather than extensive 
experience. 
d. In both labor and management arguments over the 
guarantee concept, heavy stress is being placed up-
on the vital role of stabilization devices and tech-
niques. Labor uses the guarantee to force stabil-
ization plans upon employers. l~nagement advocates 
stabilization as a means of increasing efficiency 
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and forestalling guarantee demands by employees. 
This area of management is worthy of increased 
investigation and research. At best, stabilization 
programs are far from riskless and success is not 
assured, but it appears to be the phase of manage-
ment which is most deserving of study and experi-
ment at present. The potential benefits to both 
employees and management offer the promise of rich-
ly rewarding success. 
e. Introduction of a guarantee plan \vi thout con-
siderable escape provisions for employers is an ex-
tremely hazardous venture in any enterprise. This 
risk is enlarged by introducing the plan in mass 
production industries and by failure to provide a 
planned program of stabilization methods beforehand. 
It appears extremely unlikely, at this time, that 
unions demanding guarantees in mass production com-
panies will be able to obtain anything but a weak 
compromise. Any plan adopted "YJhich grants most or 
all of the union demands will be reflection of re-
lative bargaining power rather than a recommendation 
of guarantees on the basis , of sound business policy. 
f. The foregoing conclusions are based upon the 
current situation which is extremely fluid. A suc-
cessful period of guarantee operation in a national 
size firm could produce a great deal of needed in-
formation regarding the costs and operating 
mechanics of these plans. Such information might 
considerably alter many of the current beliefs con-
cerning guarantee operations. These current beliefs 
are, it must be noted, based upon the successful but 
limited experience of a fevl firms. 
3. Recommendations. 
The above conclusions do not support a policy of in-
action concerning the future. On the basis of the devel-
opments which have occurred, the following points of ac-
tion are recommended. 
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a. A study should be made by management for the pur-
pose of apprising their ability to introduce stability 
where possible. 
b. Positive action should be taken on the basis of 
the study. Where stabilization appears possible in 
the sales, production or personnel phases, it should 
be tested to a limited extent under actual conditions. 
c. Once certain measures have been found to increase 
stability under actual operating conditions, the em-
ployees should be made aware of the company efforts. 
This information should not be entirely withheld un-
til success is assured, but should be provided, as 
needed, in the testing phase to promote employee 
awareness and co-operation. 
d. If forced to bargain on a guarantee demand by 
the union, management should approach the negotia-
tion armed with the factual evidence which the 
above steps would provide. It should attempt to 
place the burden of proof for guarantee success 
upon the union. Management, then, should do all 
that it can to stabilize, and approach actual bar-
gaining \oJi th that attitude. 
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APPENDIX A 
GUARANTEED ANNUAL ~·JAGE POLICY OF 
THE PARKER MANUFACTURING COMPANY, ~vORCESTER, l-1ASS . 
Our employees have a right to be proud of their com-
pany 's Guaranteed Annua l Wage Policy which was adopted in 1939 
by the directors to offer our workers the most progressiv e type 
of s ecurity any company can give to its employees. Recogniz-
i ng tha t the loyalty, co-operation and abilit y of our employees 
ar e part and parcel of our past and future success as a com-
pany , for the past several years Parker Manufacturing Company 
ha s put into effect an ANNUAL WAGE POLICY guaranteeing a mini-
mum of 1800 hours' pay annually to each employee with a record 
of five years continuous employment based upon the seniority 
policy of the company. 
In accordance with the above policy, any qual i fied 
employee who fails to receive at least 1800 hours of work in 
any cal endar year, will be paid by the company, at the end of 
each such year, an amount sufficient to cover the balance of 
the hours not worked up to 1800 hours, less any amounts re-
ceived in Unemployment Insurance Benefits, Workman's Compensa-
tion Benefits, Sickness, Accident and Health Benefits, and 
wages received from other re gular employment. Payment on the 
Guaranteed Annual Wa ge policy will be computed on the regular 
base rate of the employee. 
The following rules will govern the Guaranteed Annual 
Wa ge Policy of your company: 
1. The Term "Continuous Employment 11 shall mean 
time when an empl-oyee is either \-I or king daily or is on a 
granted Leave of Absence. 
2. "Continuous Employment" shall not include lay-
off periods or working periods where an employee is informed 
that such period will be temporary. 
3. The minimum of 1800 hours of guaranteed '1.-Iork 
shall include all vacation allowances. 
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4. This guarantee applies only to wage earners and 
salaried employees earning $5 ,000.00 or less annually, and 
shall immediately cease should the employee resign, be dis-
char ged for cause, attain the age of 65, or if, for any r ea son 
whatsoever, he should fail to vlork at least 320 hours in any 
calendar year. 
5. We reserve the right to transfer any employe e 
to work other than that at which he is regularly employed and 
to compensate him with the wage rate 'i.<lhich prevailed for the 
work to which he has been transferred. Such temporary changes 
would not affect the employee's seniority standing. 
6. The judgment of the Company shall be final on 
all questions concerning the guarantee, and the Company may 
at any time modify or alter the rules or may at any time ter-
minate the guarantee, although the Company fully expects to 
continue it permanently. 
7. This guarantee must necessarily be made subject 
to the restrictions and limitations of any Federal or State 
Laws, either present or future, which of cours€ are beyond 
this Company's control. 
(These statements are reproduced from The Parker 
Manufacturing Company's Employee Handbook "People, Jobs and 
Opportunities at Parker Manufacturing Co.") 
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APPENDIX B 
EXERPTS FROM THE "BIG THREE" GUARJ\.NTEE PLANS 
\*IICH WERE IN EFFECT ON JANUARY 1945 
GEORGE A. HORllliL & CO. --STRAIGHT-TIME ARRANGEMENT 
Each employee regularly assigned to a straight-
time department will receive the weekly rate of pay provided 
for him in the latest approval of the straight-time plan f or 
his department. This rate of pay will be subject to any in-
crea ses or decreases affecting -the plant as a whole. Each 
employee vJill receive his regular pay check every week ex-
cept when absent beyond regularly provided sick leave or va-
cation. *** 
The straight-time arrangement with respect to any 
department may be cancelled at any time that department f a ils 
to abide by all working agreements, or at any time the dis- _ 
continuance of the straight-time arrangement in some other de-
partment directly affecting it requires the cancellation. 
If other hour limitations become established by 
law, this plan will be changed to conform to such la.\<1, or if 
the company considers the straight-time plan unworkable be-
cause of the passage of any such law, the whole straight-
time arrangement, or any part of it, may be cancell ed as of 
the effective date of any such law. 
Any time any department becomes dissatisfied with 
the straight-time arrangement and wishes to cancel it; such 
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cancellation may be effected in the usual manner of handling 
grievances . 
Otherwise straight-time arrangement may be discon-
tinued only by thirty days' advance notice of desire to make 
such discontinuance at the end of the company's fiscal year.*** 
If there is any increase or decrease in the amount 
of work required to produce the budgeted volume, a correspond-
ing adjustment will be made in the department volume budget or 
in the number of people in the department. The choice as to 
which adjustment shall be made will be left to a decision by 
a majority in the department in case the change is an in-
crease. 
In case the required amount of work is reduced suf-
t 
ficiently to permit the removal of one or more employees, 
such employees will be transferred from the department on a 
seniority basis. When the manufacture of some item is dis-
continued, or when, because of a change in method of opera-
tion, certain job or jobs a~e ,discontinued, it is understood 
that it will be necessary to reduce the straight-time gang 
correspondingly. Such reductions will be made on the basis 
of seniority. 
Except as provided in the 2 preceding paragraphs*** 
there will be no reduction in the number of employees in apy 
straight-time department within a period of one year from the 
latest approval of th~ straight-time arrangement for that de-
partment. Any employee who is laid off from a straight-time 
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department may find employment elsewhere on the basis of his 
regular seniority rights, or, on application, may be trans-
ferred, at his regular rate of pay, to the "extra gang 11 which 
will be maintained to handle extra work, temporary replace-
ment s, and other business requirements which cannot be handled 
by the re gular straight-time departments. During the period 
of any one ' fiscal year, this ex tra gang will not be redu ced 
below the number who have been transferred to it from re gular 
s t r a i ght-time employment, thus maintaining employment with full 
pay f or at least one year for the number of individuals orig-
inally a ssigned to the straight-time schedule for any year. 
Any employee laid off from the extra gang may find 
ot her employment on the basis of his seniority rights. 
For each department for which it is possible to 
establish some measure of the work to be done, the budge t ed 
annua l volume vJill be stated. (See schedule B atta ched .) 1 
In any year in which the department produces less 
than the budgeted annual volume, the members of the depart-
ment, individually and collectively, become indebted to the 
company for producing that much work at the first opp ortunity. 
At the end of any year in which the cumulated pro-
duction of the department is in excess of the cumulated 
budgeted annual volume, bonuses will be paid the members of 
the department. These bonuses will be calculated on the basis 
of what the cost of the extra production would be by adding 
mor e employees to the department, and the specific method of 
ca lcul a ting it with respe ct to th~ department will be found 
in Schedule B. attached. 
At the end of any year in which the cumulated pro-
duction of the department is in excess of the cumulated 
budg eted annual volume , and during which re gular members of 
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t he department have been absent without pay and without being 
repl a ced , the cost of such replacements will be put in a "k i t t y" 
to be distributed among the members of the department in what -
ever manner the majority of the department may a gree. 
For each department there will be maintained wha t 
·will be knm·m as a "kitty." Schedule B attached will s h ovJ the 
department work budGet, if any . Unless otherwise provided i n 
schedule B for those departments having work budgets, em-
ployees docked for absence, and employees absent on vacat ions 
granted on the basis of 5, 15 or 20 years' service, will be 
replaced. 
Replacements will be made in either men or money. 
That is to say, if the department does not require a replace-
ment man, the money for the replacement will go to t he depart-
ment kitty . 
The mana gement will have the right to insist on re-
placements if the tonnage pr oduced falls below the daily or 
\veekly volume vJhich the company's business requires, or if the 
average actual hours worked is Dr threatens to be in ex cess of 
40 hours per week. 
The department committee will direct VIhether replace-
1 Schedule B referred to in the plan is not repr oduced. 
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ment money will be paid to individuals in the gang or whether 
it will remain in the department kitty. The money in the de-
partment kitty will be distributed among the members of the 
depa rtment at the end of each fiscal year, and in whatever 
manner the majority of the department may agree. 
NUNN-BUSH SHOE C0.--52 WEEK PAY PLAN 
A. Definition, Gross Amount, Determination Thereof. 
The parties hereto agree that the capital, manage-
ment, and labor interest in the business of the Nunn-Bush Shoe 
Co., shall constitute a. true partnership insofar as sharing 
the proceeds of production. The parties further a gree that*** 
percent of the wholesale value of the Nunn-Bush shoes*** 
packed during the term of this a greement shall be a fair re-
vJard for the labor interests as belmv limited. The manage-
ment accordingly agrees that during the period of this agree-
ment the amount paid to "labor interests" below limited shall 
equa l***percent of the wholesale ~a.lue of the Nunn-Bush shoes 
***packed during the term of this agreement*** 
In determining the wholesale price of the shoes 
packed during the term of this agreement, the prevailing 1.vhole-
sale prices at the time of packing shall be used, excep t tha t 
allowances shall be made for damaged shoes, and vJhich said al-
, 
lowance shall be determined in the manner established by the 
usua l custom. In addition thereto, mana gement agrees tha t all 
sample and trial shoes produced shall be credited a t the high-
est 111holesale price prevailing in the month ·when the sample 
or trial is completed. 
The management further agrees to notify the union 
of a ny conferences vJi th respect to contemplated changes in 
the wholesale price list and to permit any duly authorized 
agent or a gents of the union to attend such conferences. 
The management further agrees to give free a ccess 
to the necessary books and records of the management and f ull 
cooper ation once during each calendar year to an auditor or 
auditors selected by the union to check the wholesale va lue 
of the shoes packed during the life of this agreement and 
the earnings paid out of the workers' share-production f und. 
The management further a grees to forward to the union ea ch 
month during the term of this agreement its most accura t e 
estimate of the status of the said workers' share-production 
fund* ** 
B. Drawing Accounts and Classification of Membership 
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In order to effect an orderly distribution of the 
union members' share of the receipts of the company, the parties 
agr ee tha t a. drawing account system, as hereinafter more fully 
set forth, shall be employed.***percent of the wholesale va lue, 
as hereinbefore adjusted, of the Nunn-Bush shoes***packed dur-
ing the life of this a. greement***shall be credit ed to the afore-
mentioned drawing account by management. 
That furthermore all payments made, except as pro-
vided in the section of this contract designated "overtime" 
shall be cha rged to the aforenamed drawing account, which 
said payments have been classified under the heading of 
"wages" on the books of the company. This group of employ-
ees, a s hereinafter more fully set forth, shall constitute 
the "labor interest" hereinabove referred to. 
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This said labor interest shall consist of the fol-
lowing classifications of membership and the rights, interests 
and benefits of each classification: 
nThe class A membership shall consist of t hose 
workers whose service record began with the Nunn-Bush Shoe 
Co. prior to March 1, 1942, and such workers who have attained 
a class A rating since said time, except those workers who, 
because of a disqualification as hereinafter more fully set 
forth, vJ ere unable to attain the said class A membership. The 
class A ·worker shall constitute a permanent labor force and 
shall not be subject to lay-offs. The class A workers are · to 
share excl usively in whatever production that can be sec~red 
by the management until such time as increased production 
necessitates additional 1-1orkers, as hereinafter enumera ted. 11 
The total membership of class A workers is limited 
to 595, including those class A members and workers who attain 
a clas s A membership i.vhile on leave of absence; it be ing under-
s tood that care must be taken that the rights of all \vorkers 
who are on leave of absence are preserved when promotions to 
class A memberships are made. 
"The class B membership shall consist of all those 
workers except those hereinafter or hereinbefore classified 
a s otherwise, who have been employed at the Nunn-Bush Shoe 
Co., Milwaukee plant, for a period of at least 2 years. These 
said class B members shall immediately begin to participate 
in the share production plan at the commencement of the first 
4-week period after the second anniversary of their employ-
ment, and they shall be entitled to all the rights, interests 
and benefits of the class A membership, except that they may 
be subj ect to lay-off in accordance with the terms of this 
contract. 
"The class C membership shall consist of all workers 
who had not reached the age of 45 years at the time of their 
con1mencing employment a t the Nunn-Bush Shoe Co., Mil vJaukee 
plant, such members, of course, being members in good stand-
ing in the *** union *** but who shall have served less than 
2 years. 
"The class D membership shall consist of those work-
ers i.>Jho are 45 years of age or more at the commencemen t of 
their employment with the company and who have not previously 
earned a higher classification as hereinbefore set forth. 
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";The class DB membership shall consist of those class 
D members who have completed 2 years of employment with the 
company and who are eligible to the share production plan. 
The same is hereinbefore explained in reference to Class B 
members. However, such class DB members shall at no time be 
~-------
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eligible for promotion to class A membership. 
"The class HA membership shall consist of those 
workers who were previously classified as class A members but 
who, because of their physical or mental impediment, "l.vere un-
able to perform the minimum of work provided in the various 
factory schedules and consequently were taken out of t h e share 
production plan. Such members ar e to be paid on an hourly 
basis. Otherwise, they shall have the same rights and bene-
fits of the class A membership wi th respect to lay-offs. 
"The class HB membership shall consist of those 
workers who were previously classified as class B but who 
possessed some physical or mental impediment and could not 
perform the minimum amount of work provided in the various 
factory schedules and consequently wer e taken out of the 
share production pl a n. Such members shall be paid on an hour -
l y basis." 
Class B members shall be promoted to class A mem-
bership according to seniority upon vacancy occurring i n the 
class A membership hereinbefore set forth and agreed upon a s 
being limited to 595, due to death, resignation, discharge 
or permanent termination of employment. Provided, hoVIever, 
if there are no members in the class B membership , then the 
cla ss C members shall be promoted to class A membership a c-
cording to seniority upon vacancies occurring in the cla ss A 
membership; provided further, however, that such cla ss C mem-
bers shall have at least 2 years ' service record at the Milwaukee 
plant of the *** company . 
All classes A, B, and DB employees are to equally 
share in pr oduction in accordance with the present ex isting 
agreement with the management. 
All cla sses B and DB member s may be laid off when 
production needs are not suff i cient to maintain class A 
members wor ki ng at least 40 hours per week . In the event of 
necessity of lay-off, there shall be no discrimina tion be-
twe en class C and class D members, except on a basis of senior -
ity r i ghts. Tha t furthermore in the event of a furt he r l ay-
off, there shall be no discrimination between a class B em-
ploye e and a class DB employee, also, except on the ba sis of 
s eni ority r i ghts. 
Classes HA, HB, c, and D members are wag e earner s 
and work for a stipulated amount per hour, the total of t heir 
wages being paid out of the gr oss share before any balance is 
allocated to the accounts of classes A, B, and DB. 
Earnings of classes A, B, and DB members a r e to be 
allocated to the individual account of each of said members, 
that member being paid in cash any balance to his or her credit 
after providing for a reserve fund of 12t percent of his or 
her annual est imated income which said reserve includes pro-
vision for holidays, vacation period or sick leave a s herein-
after more fully set forth. The adjustments on said individual 
accounts shall be made at the end of each Lt--week period and 
when the reserve in each individual account exceeds 12t per-
cent of the annual estimated income, the excess shall be 
paid during the following 4-week period, permission being 
gr anted to mana gement to include said excess in the regu-
l ar weekly drawing. *** 
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Management further agrees to pay interest on the 
ba l ance in the individual reserve accounts of the sa id 
clas ses A, B, and DB members at the same rate as is currently 
being paid by banks on savings deposit accounts (cur r ently 
agreed at l percent per annum) except, however, such com-
putations shall be made at the end of the 4·-\veek period in 
accordance with the adjustment s made on the individual ac-
count of each member . *** 
It is agreed that during the period of this con-
tract, change s ma y be made in the differential base rates 
upon mutual agreement by and between management and the ex-
ecutive board of the union . 
It is agreed for the purpose of calculating the 
dravJ ing a ccount of each individual member of the union, a 
yearly differential rate of 2, 080, or 40 x 52, multiplied 
by the present average hourly drawing , shall be the basis of 
ca lculation. · However, adjustments in individual differentia l 
rates may be made during the period of this a greement, but 
such individual adjustments shall not be effective or pa id 
until a pproved by the executive board of the union; provided, 
h owever, t ha t when production department members are called 
to do maintenance work, they shall receive compensation at a 
rate a greed upon by and between the management and the ex -
ecutive board of the union; *** 
C. Stabilized Annual Income 
For the purpose of stabilizing annual earnings of 
the employees of the company in the union's jurisdiction, 
it is agreed that each class A, B, and DB member shall re-
ceive at least 1 dravJing for each week that this agre ement 
is effective, and that the amount of such drawing will be 
a t least 1/52 of the member's yearly differential rate ex-
cep t a s that differential rate may be changed in a ccordanc e 
with the provision permitting adjustments of the i ndivi dual 
rates and except -as the multiplier can be changed in ac-
cordance with the provision hereinafter relating to"over -
drafts .11 However, for the purpose of establishing in all de-
partments uniformity of drawing for absence, due to recognized 
cause, the union a grees that each class A, B, and DB member 
shall be entitled during t he term of this contra ct to 5 days 
of ab sence with drawings for recognized cause. 
D. Reserve and Overdraft 
· The parties agree that it is highly advisable to 
establish a reserve in the workers' fund of each individual 
clas s A, B, and DB member, in such instances a s hereinbefore 
set forth, in order to guard aga inst the disruptance of draw-
ing schedules due to adverse business conditions and both 
parties a gree to promote the accumulation and maintenance of 
such re serve accordingly. Commencing February 26 , 1945 , this 
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reserve shall consist of 12t percent of the annual estimated 
income, the same being computed by multiplying the present 
avera ge hourly drawing by 2,080. The said 12t percent in-
dividual reserve account shall include drawing for 1-week 
vacation, 5 holidays and 5 sick days. However, management 
Hill continue to pay the regular 1,-1eekly drawing including 
weeks with holidays, vacation and 5 days of sick leave, if 
by so doing the individual reserve is not reduced below 5 
percent of the annual estimated income but no monthly or ad-
justed compensation payments will be had if by so doing, the 
sa id reserve is reduced to a sum less than 12t percent of the 
annual estimated income. 
l.vhen it is apparent that due to adverse business 
conditions the said reserve accounts shall be depleted if no 
change is made, the dra,.,ring account rates shall be revised 
by agreement between the management and the executive board 
of the union to a point where the reserve account will at no 
time be less than 5 percent of the annual estimated income. 
PROCTER & GAHBLE 
GUARlil\TTY OF REGULAR EHPLOYHENT TO EJ-1PLOYEES 
The following pr ovisions constitute the plan known 
as The Proctor & Gamble Guaranty of Regular Employment and will 
apply at such f actories of the *':<* Company *** as have been 
duly notified in writing of their inclusion in said plan by 
order of the board of directors of the *** Company. *** 
To the employees located at such factories a s above 
stated whose pay is computed on an hourly rate, and who have 
ha d a t least 24 consecutive months of employment i mmediately 
preceding the application of this pl a n to their employment , 
the undersigned company hereby guarantees re gular employment 
for not less than 48 weeks (or its time equivalent) in each 
ca lendar yea.r les s only time lost by reason of holiday clos-
ings, vacation vJi th pay, disability due to sickness or injury, 
voluntary absence, or due to fires, floods, strikes , or other 
emergency whether like the fore going or not, and subject to 
the following provisions: 
Regular employment shall be understood to mean em-
ployment for not less than the hour week established from 
time to time by the company as the standard hour week at 
each of its factories. 
Vfuen an employee first comes under this guaranty 
after January 1 of any calendar year, the company guarantees 
to him under the terms and provisions outlined herein that he 
shall not be unemployed in excess of 4 week s (or its time 
equiva lent), plus time lost for reasons herein stated, during 
the remainder of the calendar year. 
The company reserves the right under the guaranty 
to t ransfer any employee to work other than that at which he 
is re gularly employed, and to compensate him for the same in 
accordance with the wage rate which prevails for the work to 
which he has been transferred. 
Upon authorization from the board of director s and 
"~tJithout changing the established hour 1>Jeek, the hours of 
work for employees coming within the terms of this guaranty 
may be limited to 75 percent of the established hour week 
less time lost for reasons stated above, whenever in the 
opinion of the board of directors such action seems justi-
f ied. 
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Any individual hired to replace an employee leaving 
for military service or training, or for other services made 
necessary by a national emergency, shall be considered a 
temp orary employee and he shall be so informed at the time 
of hi s em:r.,loy-ment. The company vJill not consider such an 
employee within this guaranty. If at a later date subsequent 
to his employment, conditions should warrant it, within the 
sole discretion of the company, he may be informed that he 
is then eligible for this guaranty in accordance with the 
terms of this plan. 
The right to discharge any employee at any time is 
reserved to the company employing such employee. 
This guaranty of employment has been established 
be caus e the company believes it to be sound business practice 
and a desira ble protection for its employees. It is the in-
t ent of the company to maintain it, but the company must and 
does reserve the unqualified right , to be exercised at its 
sole discretion, to withdraw this guaranty at any of its 
factories, or to terminate or to modify this guaranty at any 
time. 
(These plans were reproduced from Appendix A of the U.S . 
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics Bullentin 
No. 828) 
APPENDIX C 
EXERPTS FROM THE UAW PAMPHLET, 
"QUESTIONS .AND ANS\rJERS ABOUT 
THE UAW-CIO GUARANTEED EHPLOYHENT PLAN." 
WILL THE GUARANTEED ENPLOYlvtENT PLAN ELH1INATE B0011 AND 
BUST CYCLES IN OUR ECONOHY? 
The Guaranteed Employment Plan in itself will not 
eliminate boom and bust cycles. The UAW-CIO has never said 
it would. Widespread negotiation of Guaranteed Employment 
Plans will, however, help to smooth out and in some cases to 
avoid dangerous ups and dovms in production and employment 
in the whole American economy, and will serve in a major v1ay 
to cushion the shock of recessions and depressions. 
For example, if we look at the American economy 
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as a so-called "inventory recession" gets under way, we notice 
that goods are piling up on the shelves because they are not 
being sold. Business men who have these surplus goods on 
hand reduce their orders and workers are laid off. The laid-
off workers have less money and are able to buy less than be-
fore. They cut dovm their purchases, more goods pile up and 
more workers are laid off. And so it goes, down the spiral. 
The guarantee of income during layoff will help put 
the brakes on this kind of depression spiral. If workers who 
are laid off as a result of accumulated surpluses have incomes 
maintained while they ar e laid off, their purchasing power can 
help to wipe out those surpluses quickly and assur e their speedy 
recall to 1r1ork. 
This is one of the purposes of the Guaranteed Em-
ployment Plan, and this is the way in which it helps prevent 
depressions. It helps get the economy back on the track by 
providing purchasing power when it is most needed. 
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vliLL THE GUARANTEED EMPLOYMENT PLAN END LAYOFFS? 
The Plan vJill in time eliminate many kinds of la y-
o.ffs, and "\vill reduce the number and duration of others. It 
will not end layoffs altogether. 
As managements learn to operate under the Guaranteed 
Employment Plan, many thousands of workers viho in past year s 
have been laid off be cause of model changeover s, inventory 
taking and similar interrupt i ons of work will not be l aid off 
at all f or t hese purposes--just as such layoffs were largely 
avoided in the i mmediate postwar year s when the demand for 
goods made it in management ' s interest to keep production roll-
ing . 
Layoffs due to seasona l fluctuations in sales vJill 
be sharply reduced, if not eliminated altogether, by sale s 
and pr oduction policies designed to reduce seasona l h i ghs and 
lovJs, and by all the me thods that management ingenuity vJill 
devise when they have to pay a. financial penalty for failur e 
to do so. 
La yoffs due to interruptions of work from such 
causes a s material shortages, breakdown of machinery , etc., 
v.Jill be largely eliminated by better mana gement planning . 
In making technological changes, in mer gers, in 
transfers of \vork to new locations, etc., managements 1.vill 
also be compelled to plan how such changes can be made with 
the mini mwn dislocation of the ,,1orkers involved. 
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As Guaranteed Employment Plans become more vJide-
spread, and as corporations become financially more interest-
ed in national full employment policies, there will be a 
stabilizing effect on purchasing power which will help to 
prevent layoffs due to wide swings in our whole economy . 
~nd, of course, when workers are laid off under the 
Guaranteed Employment Plan they will continue to receive in-
come to ma inta in their living standards and their purchasing 
power . This 1.<1ill make the layoffs that may still occur less 
of a threat to the worker , and less of a loss to the economy. 
WILL THE PLAN END SHORT \'/ORI\}VEEKS AND SHORT PAY CHECKS? 
The elimination of short vJorkweeks is a l most wholly 
\•Ji thin the control of management and the Guaranteed Employ-
ment Plan should virtually eliminate two-, three- and four-
day a week work schedules. In particular it will put an end 
once and for all to the vicious pract ice of unscrupulous cor-
pora tions that schedule shor t workweeks with the deliberate 
intent of giving the workers just enough in earnings to make 
them ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits. 
Short workweeks nmv are costly to the vJOrker. He 
receives a short pay check. For one or more days a week his 
productive ability is wasted and he receives no pay . Under 
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the UAW Plan the short workweek will not be costly to the 
worker, but to the employer. If it costs the employer more 
money rather than less money to operate a short vJOrk1..veek, he 
will operate a full workvieek. 
This 1140-hour pay" guarantee is like an extension 
of the four-hour call-in pay clause, 'YJhich we now have in 
most UAvl agreements. The call-in pay clauses eliminated the 
old practice of calling people into work when there was no 
work available . Once the union contract shifted the cost of 
this kind of irresponsibility from the vwrker to the manage-
ment the practice ended •. 
Short vJorkweeks will also become a thing of the 
past once their cost has been transferred to the employer, 
where it belongs. 
IF THE BIG CORPOR..A. TI ONS NEGOTIATE THE GUARA NTEED EiviPLOYHENT 
PLAN , HOW VJILJ:, THIS AFFECT THE SUPPLIER PLANTS? 
Supplier firms will immediately benefit from the 
stabilization of production in the plants which buy their 
products. Leveling out the peaks and valleys in the assembly 
corporations in our industries will provide a measure of sta-
bility for the steel industry, the glass industry , the textile 
industry, the rubber industry, the parts industry and others 
from vJhich the assembly corporations a re major purchasers. 
The suppliers will have a higher degree of security; 
they \r.Jill lr...now that the demand for their products 1r.Jill be even, 
rather than irregular. Workers in supplier plants will have 
more re gular work a s a result of negotiation of the pl ans in 
the major firms. 
Because of its stabilizin g effect on the whole in-
dustry, a nd the pattern which it will establish, negotiation 
of the Guaranteed Employment Plan with the ma jor corporation s 
will a lso make it easier for the Union to win the guarante e 
i n the plants of the supplier compani es . 
- ILL THE PL N CAUSE THE LARGE CORPORATI OHS TO CONTRACT OUT 
HORE OR LESS OF THEIR \'V'ORK TO SUPPL I ER FIRMS ? 
It has been argued that if the lar ge companies ne-
gotiat e a Guaranteed Employment Plan they 1.~J ill farm out to 
smaller firms some of the work they now do themselves . This 
154. 
is a n argument which management has spread among workers in 
l arge corporations. At the same time the workers in the small-
er companies are told that the Plan would result in the large 
corpora tions gobbl ing up their suppliers in order to mak e sure 
t ha t irregulari ties in the flow of parts supplier pl an t s will 
not result in layoffs in the l a r ge corporation. 
Both of these management a rguments are false. If a 
company now finds it profitable to make some of its own sup-
plies , the pr oduction of these parts will still be profitable 
after the Guaranteed Employment Plan goes into effect. And if 
a company now finds it profitable to purchase some of its part s 
from suppliers, the introduction of the Plan will not ma ke it 
unprofitable. By sta bilizing produc t ion schedules, in fact , 
the a ssembly corporation may be able to ne gotiate supplier de-
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livery contracts on a firmer basis, and the supplier, knovJ ing 
that demand for his products is levelled out, will be in a 
better position to quote lower prices and to make good on 
stricter delivery terms. 
There has been, of course, a long- term trend to-
ward integration in our industries. The big companies have 
been taking over production of an increasing share of their 
parts and subassemblies. Negotiation of a Guaranteed Em-
ployment Plan is not likely to stop tha t trend. But it will 
mean that when integration takes place the workers whose jobs 
are affected will enjoy a degree of security--a period of 
adjustment vli thout loss of income--that they do not have to-
day. 
WILL EMPLOYERS REDUCE THE :NUHBER OF REGULAR EMPLOYEES itJHEN 
THEY NEGOTIATE THE GUARA.NTEED EHPLOYNENT PLAN? 
Employers have tried to frighten and confuse work-
ers by sugge sting that negotiating the Guaranteed Employment 
Plan would cause them to reduce the size of their working 
force. Actually, the Plan will not make it profitable for em-
ployers to lay off or terminate regular workers. 
The Plan will, however, end the irresponsible and 
morally indefensible practice of some industries under our 
jurisdiction, of importing workers from all over the country 
for only a few months ' work. For example, the recruitment of 
thousands of workers by the auto industry during the early months 
of 1953 1:1hen there was only three to six months 1 \;Jork for them 
is a policy not likely to be repeated once the industry has 
the Guaranteed Employment Plan. The employment given t he se 
wor ers was of little help to them, since they were soon 
dump ed out on the streets far from their home communities, 
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and it meant that the regul ar vJOrkers of the auto corporations 
were deprived of v1 ork later in the year that they other1.<1 ise 
would have had . If the Guaranteed Employment Plan had been 
in effect the corporations would have kno-vm that by follovJing 
such a :policy they were malcing themselves liable for heavy 
guaranteed wage payments to their regular workers, and they 
vJOuld have pl anned production schedules so as to avoid having 
to lay these workers off. 
The Pl an does not discourage employers from hiring 
new workers when there is a genuine increase in the amount of 
work avail able, because new worker s' rights to guarantee pay-
ments when laid off are only gradually built up. It grants 
the employer considerable flexibility even 1.11hen such increased 
work is only temporary. But it will discoura ge the ki nd of re -
cruitment of temp orary workers that l ater leads to layoffs of 
regular 1wr ker s . 
WILL THE GUARANTEED EMPLOYMENT PLAN CREATE A GROUP OF PEOFLE 
I N OUR SOCIETY vlliO \>JILL F..A VE NO EMfLOY~mNT OPPORTUNITY'? 
Ho. This notion, vJhich has been dreamed up by op-
ponents of the Plan, goes l ike this: Since the Plan requires 
a guarantee of employment to vJOrkers, management \vill cut down 
the number of workers employed in order to reduce the number 
of people for whom it must assume responsibility under t he 
Plan. 
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It should be clear that under the Plan managemen t 
will operate with as many workers as it can efficiently em-
pl oy on a full-time basis . There is nothing in the Plan 
which would give management any incentive to reduce annual 
production, or to stop expanding production. Thus the num-
ber of regular workers could be reduced only by scheduling 
over t i me for those remaining at vJOrk . That is 1.vhy the prin-
ciple of graduated duration has been included in the Plan, 
and the ratio of graduation to 1.veeks of employment carefully 
determined so that it will always cost management less to 
hire additional permanent workers than to schedule overtime 
for those already employed. 
The Plan will deter management from scheduling pro-
duc t ion in such a way that it will have to recruit outside 
vJorkers for temporary employment in one part of the yea r a nd 
then l a y off regular workers for weeks or months in a nother 
part of the year. Elimination of this evil is one of the goals 
of the Plan. 
By stabilizing the purchasing pmver of workers the 
Guaranteed Employment Plan, as it becomes more and more wi de-
spr ea d, will increase the demand for goods and thus increase 
employment opportunities. Rather than "create groups of people 
1.-.rho will have no employment opportunities" it 1-1ill create more 
opportunities of permanent employment for those 1·1ho novJ have 
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to exist from one tempora ry job to another with l ong spel l s of 
une:mployment .and har dship in between. 
WILL THE GUAR.4.NTEED EHPLOYl''iENT PLAN CAUSE SHARP PI-UCE I N-
CREASES? 
No.. The Guaranteed Employment Plan will not even 
affect costs as much as a vJage increase I:JOuld, because it will 
lead to leveling out of production and more efficient use of 
plant facilities and manpower which \.Jill result in savings to 
count er-balance the costs. 
If management takes advantage of all the opportuni-
ti es available to reduce costs under the Plan, the savings may 
a ctually amount to more than the amounts paid our in wa ge guar-
antees. 
Even though in the early years of the Plan ther e 
are some costs to management, while a Reserve Fund is being 
built up, the price to consumers need not be increased. Manage-
ment's pricing policies are based chiefly on hm-1 much mana ge-
ment thinks the traffic \.Jill bear. For example, there 1v ould 
have been inflation after World War II even if not a single 
\<Jorker had got a wage increase, simply because consumers had 
a great need of civilian goods, and had a reserve of wa r time 
savings with which they 1vere able to pay the prices mana gement 
chose to charge. If unions had not been able to gain some wage 
i n creases, prices would still have gone up, profits would have 
been even more excessive than they were, the workers would 
have been that much worse off, and the decline in business 
due to drying up of purchasing pm,Jer would have taken place 
that much sooner. 
There need not be any long-term increase in costs 
under the Guaranteed Employment Plan, and although there are 
some costs in the early years they will be of a size that, 
tmder normal conditions, management can very well absorb out 
of profits without increasing prices. 
tVILL THE GUARANTEED EMPLOYJvrENT PLAN PREVENT AUTOHATION? 
No. The Guaranteed Employment Plan vJill not pre-
vent the employer from making use of tech~ological progress 
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to increase efficiency of production . It 1.vill insure that 
automation is not introduced in irresponsible ways which would 
produce hardship and suffering for many thousands of workers. 
The Guaranteed Employment Plan will not prevent auto-
mation, but it will affect management decisions regarding t he 
timing of automation and the location of automated plants. It 
will, for example, give management an incentive to gear the in-
troduction of automation to periods of expanding markets when 
other jobs will be available for displaced workers, and to de-
fer it in times when it would mean mass layoffs. It will give 
management an incentive to introduce automation gradually when-
ever possible, so that reductions in working force can be taken 
care of through normal labor turnover (quits, retirements, etc.). 
In the frequent cases where automation can be more 
efficiently adopted by building a new plant rather than install-
ing new equipment in an older plant not designed for it, the 
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Guaranteed Employment Plan 'l.vill tend to assure that such new 
plants will be so located a s to faci litate transfer of work-
ers from the former plant . It will place hea vy penalties on 
irresponsible corporate policies that would leave t housand s 
of workers stranded in ghos t towns. 
In short, t he Guaranteed Employment Plan will com-
pel management to exercise a degree of social responsibility 
in introducing automat ion by having to bear a lar ge part of 
the social costs of irresponsibility . 
When some dislocation of workers is an unavoidable 
result of automation , the guarantee payments made to the \vork-
er s laid off will give them time to make an orderly adjustment . 
They vJill have up to a year in 1vhich to find suitable nevJ jobs 
or to enable them, vlhere desirable, to undertake retra ining 
for better jobs. And it will give maximum incentive to em-
ployer s to assist workers in finding suitable jobs in order 
to minimi ze the period for which guarantee payment s would 
otherwise have to be made. 
WILL THE GUARANTEED EMPLOTI{ENT PLAN PREVENT DECENTRALIZ TI ON? 
No. But it will make employers t hink twice before 
moving an operation to another area. 
The Guaranteed Emplo~nent Plan will not prevent the 
employer from moving operations from one plant to another, or 
into nevJ pl ants, when such changes are economically sound. It 
will insure that in making such change s the employer will have 
to take into account some of the costs to the workers and the 
communi ties involved as well as the costs that shovJ up on 
his own financial records. 
The Guaranteed Employment Plan i.vill mean tha. t i.oJhen 
an employer decides to move an operation or a whole plant out 
of a community, he will have to make plans for continued em-
ployment of the workers affected, or pay the cost of failing 
to do so. He may meet his obligation by making suitable ar-
rangements to encourage workers to move with the plant. He 
may arrange to keep the plant in operation making other pro-
ducts, or he may see that it is sold to another manufacturer 
who will provide suitable employment opportunities . There are 
many 1.-.rays in which management can insure that workers and com-
muni ties do not suffer unnecessarily when a plant is moved. 
The Guaranteed Employment Plan simply means that the employer 
is forced to face up to the problems created by his move. He 
will no longer be able to run away and leave the problems be-
hind for others to bear. 
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IS 1'HE UAv.J PLAN DIFFEHENT FROH EXISTING GUARl!.NTEED \~AGE PLANS ? 
Yes, our Plan is different in very basic ways from 
any guaranteed 1<Jage plan no'i-J in operation because it has been 
designed to solve UAW members' problems. Host of the other 
plans were designed by employers to solve empl oyers' problems 
while others were developed to meet conditions in industries 
much different from ours. 
Some of these plans guarantee only that the total 
amount paid out in wages plus guarantee payments will equal a 
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certain percentage of the company's sales. Thus the "guar-
antee" fluctuates with changes in production or prices, and 
is no guarantee of income at all . It does nothing to prevent 
loss of income due to many kinds of layoffs and short work-
\.veeks. 
Other plans guarantee a minimum flat amount in an-
nual earnings, or a minimum number of hours' vJOrk per year . 
They are limi ted to a calendar year, which means that the 
wor kers' security grows less and less a s the year goes on. 
Once the workers have had the minimum earnings or minimum 
hour s guaranteed for that year, they get no further security 
a t all . Workers on layoff when the new year starts are given 
no guarante e at all until they return to 'tvork. The UA\1 Plan 
guarantees that vJOrkers vJill receive full pay checks every 
week they work, and income to maintain their living standards 
during layoffs up to 52 continuous weeks, starting from the 
day of layoff and regardless of when the layoff may c ommence. 
Some of the plans that guarantee a tota l number of 
hours of work during the year take no regard of when t he hours 
a re actually 1.vorked. Consequently, they have no effect on 
week-to-week instability of earnings and would do nothing to 
solve the UAW members' problems of short work~eeks and short 
pay checks. 
Some of the plans that guarantee a weekly income re-
quire the workers to work whatever hours management schedules 
in any week without extra pay. A worker may be given as much 
as 53 hours of work a week and receive only the same pay as 
he would get for a normal workweek, provided his total hours 
for the year do not exceed 2,080. The worker get s no premi-
um a t all for overtime work, and even the stra ight-time pay 
for overtime hours is nbanked 11 to pay for other periods of 
idleness. 
lvfany existing plans provide the guarantee only for 
a limited number or percentage of high seniority workers. 
The U W Plan provides security for all workers in the plant . 
All these features distinguish the UA\1/- CIO Guaran-
te ed Employment Plan from others now in operation. 
ARE THERE PROBLEMS THE GUARANTEED EHPL OYHENT PLAN DOES !,JOT 
SOLVE? 
The Guaranteed Employment Plan is aimed at one 
pr oblem only--the problem of steady work and steady pay . It 
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is designed to minimize short workweeks and layoffs and to 
protect the worker and his family against them when they occur. 
Workers have many other problems that the Plan does 
not attempt to solve. 
The Guaranteed Employment Plan does nothing to in-
crease our pension benefits, paid vacations, sickness and ac-
cident benefits or wage rates. It does not solve prod11ction 
standard problems or reduce the possibility of accidents in 
the plant. All of these problems, and others, are important 
to the member s of our Union . We need to have specific pro-
grams to meet all of them. 
The Guaranteed Employment Plan is not a cure-all. 
It is a remedy for short pay checks and for layoffs without 
inc ome. 
WHAT ABOUT THE RGUNENT THA.T THE GUARANTEED EMPLOYMENT PLAN 
FAVORS ONE GROUP OF \.VORKERS AT THE EXPENSE OF ANOTHER? 
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This old line has been peddled about every maj or 
collective bargaining demand of the Union. The same thing 
was said about our demand for pension plans. It wa s claimed 
that onl y older workers would be in favor of pension pl ans 
and that younger worker s would want wage increases or other 
economic benefits instead of pensions. But UAW members stuck 
together and fought for pensions. The pension pl ans, which 
nm" cover more than a million UAW members, are pr oof that 
member s of our Union know vJha t 1 s good for them and cannot be 
divided by company propaganda. 
The Guaranteed Employment Plan will not divide our 
members. It is advantage ous for all members: it guarantees 
full workwe eks for every one in the shop. It provides income 
during layoff for both high and low seniority workers. 
Graduation of the number of weeks of guaran tee 
right s based on previous employment assures that employment 
opportunities will be kept open for young workers. Coverage 
of new workers from the time they acquire seniority as sures 
that protection against layoffs will be available for the low-
s enior ity workers who stand in greatest need of such pr otection. 
The high seniority workers, on the other hand, know 
that seniority in itself provides no absolute guarantee 
against layoffs. In the past few years, members of our 
Union with 30 years ' seniority or more have either perman-
ently lost their jobs or been laid off for extended periods. 
H i gh seniority workers were stranded when Ford abandoned the 
Iron Hountain and L ' Anse plants. High as ".-Jell as 1m.; senior-
ity workers \'Jere affect ed when Nash shut dm~Tn some plants for 
10 we eks in the summer of 1953, vJhen Huds on worked an average 
of less than two full weeks per month early this year, when 
Studebaker worked four-day weeks, alternating with weeks of 
shut-down. In addition, the high senior i ty worker is in just 
as much danger a s the new vlorker when a plant burns to the 
ground, vJhen a company liquidates or merges wi tb another, 
when technological changes make existing plants obsolete, and 
1.;hen lack of sales leads companies to shut their plants for 
extended periods on the excuse of model changeovers or lay-
offs. The rapid grmvth of automation means that no worker, 
regardless of his skill or length of service, can be certain 
that his job 'tdll not be entirely eliminated in the future. 
The Guaranteed Employment Plan offers security for 
every one . Every worker needs it. 
165. 
I. Books 
BIBLIOGRI\.PHY 
1. Chernick , Jack and Hellickson, George c. 
11 Cjuaranteed A. nnnal Wages." ~Hnneapolis, Univers-
ity of Minnesota Press, 1945 
166 . 
2. Kaplan, A. D. H. "The Guarantee of Annua l Wa ges." 
Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1947 
3. Smith, Edwin S. "Reducing Seasonal Unemploymen t.tt 
Ne111 York, McGraw-Hill, 1931 
4. Snider, Joseph L. 11 The Guarantee of Work nd Wa ges. 11 
Boston, Harva rd Universi t y Press, 1947 
5 . 11Steadier Jobs--A Handbook For Nana gement On Sta-
bilizing Employment. 11 New York , Industria l Re-
lations Counselors, 1954 
II. Booklets and Pamphlets 
6. ttGua r an t eed Annual Wages . " (Reprinted from 
"Economic Outlook .u Oct. 1953) (Parv.phle t No . 231) 
Washington, CIO Department of Research and Edu-
cation. pp . 73-80 
7. "Guaranteed Wages l.'he Year Round.n ashi ngton , 
CIO Department of Research and Education, 1945 
8. "Industry ' s View on the Guaranteed Annua l Wage 
and Its I mplications to a Free Economy. 11 NevJ York , 
Nationa l Association of Manufacturers. l~r ch 1954 
9 . "Jobs or Jobless Pay?" Washington, Chamb er of 
Commerce of the United States, 1954 
10. ttQuestions and Ans>tJers 
teed Employment Plan." 
tion No. 330) Detroit, 
ment, 1955 
About t he UAW-CIO Guaran-
(Reprinted from Publica-
U W-CIO Education Depart-
11 . ttThe Economics of the Guaranteed Wage." Wa shington, 
Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Committee 
on Economic Policy. 1953 
12. "The Guaranteed Annual Wa e: An Active Issue." 
Industrial Relations Memos No. 131 New York , 
Industrial Relations Counselors. Oct. 1, 1953 
167. 
III. Newspap~rs and Periodicals 
13. .Ab.els, Jules. "Annual vlage Hopes Are Illusions: 
Only Small Segments of the Economy Can Have Them." 
Barron's v. 27, no. 11, March 17, 1947 pp. 32-33 
14. Lucy, Charles. "Annual Wage Showdown--Reuther 
Out On Limb In Strike Threat." Boston Herald. 
Feb. 24, 1955, pp. 2 
15 . 
16. 
17. 
18 . 
"Hanagement's New Problem.u 
April 11, 1953 pp. 96ff 
Business 1·leek . 
ttQ, M. ShO\oJs 1 54 Good Year; Car Sales Up 3 Per-
cent ,H Christian Science Iv!onitor. Thursday, 
Mar ch 3, 1955, pp . 13 
"Guaranteed Annual Waa e Controvers- • 11 Commercial 
and Financial Chronicle. v. 17 , No . 5104, 
April 3, 1952, pp. 1395 
"Labor ; What 1 s Behind the News and 1.ffia t 1 s 
Ahead." Fortune, v. LI, No. 1, January 1955 , 
pp . 47-50 
Life Magazine 
19. Editorial: "Reuther's Guaranteed Wage. 11 v. 35, 
No. 7, February 14, l955. pp. 49 
20. Caughlan, Robert. "Co-Captains in Ford's Battle 
For Supremacy ." v. 38, No. 9, February 28, 1955 . 
pp . 84-96 
National Industrial Conference Board: Management Record 
21. "Guaranteed Annual \vage--The New Look." v. 26, 
No. 1, January, 1954. pp . 2-5, 36-39 
22. "Annual Wage Round Table." v. 26, No. 3, H.a.r ch 
1954, pp. lOOff 
23. 
24. 
25. 
"Management Looks at the G.A.W." v. 26, No. 8 , 
August 195Lt-, pp. 290-293 
11 CIO Demand: Nation 's 
BUsiness. v. 104 
Murray, Phillip. "A Guaranteed Annual Wage For 
Labor?" New York Times Magazine, April 8, 1945. 
pp . 12 ff 
26. Smith , F. C. 11 \Vhat Union Workers Th i nk of t he 
Hormel Plan." Personnel Journal. v . 29 , No . 9 , 
February 1951, pp . 325-330 
IV. Publica tions of Govt. gencies , Associa tions et c. 
27 . 
28 . 
29 . 
30. 
31. 
Automobile Facts and Figures, 34th Edit i on , 
Detroit, Automobile Manufacturer's s s oc i a tion . 
1954, 76 pp . 
"Booming South Big New Market For Automobiles ." 
Automobile Facts, v. 13, No. 7, October 1954, 
Automobile }~nufacturer 1 s Associa tion. pp. 1-3 
Brower, F. Beatrice. "Annual Wage a nd Employment 
Guarant ee Plans." (Studies i n Per s onnel Pol icy 
No. 76) New York , National Industrial Conference 
Board, 1938, 55 pp . 
Dale, Er nest. "Annual WaP"es and Em lo ment Sta -
bilization Techniques." Research Repol' t No. 
New ~.ork, American Manag ement ssoc iat i on, 1945 
"Financial, Industrial, Commercial Sta tistics, 
U. S. " Federal Reserve Bulletin . v. 41, No. 2, 
February 1955, 1vashington, Board of Governors , 
Federal Reserve System. pp . 185 
168 . 
32. "Guaranteed Etllployment and Annual Wage Pr ovis ions 
in Union greements. 11 (Bulletin No. 828 ) Wa sh i ng -
ton, U.S. Depar t ment of Labor. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics. 1945, 26 pp . 
33. "Guaranteed Wages: A Report to t he President by 
the Advisory Board." Washingt on, U.S. Off ic e of 
War Mob i lization . Office of Temp or ary Controls. 
1947, 473 pp . 
Levine, Horton and Nix , James. "Guarant eed Em-
nlo ent and \va es Under Collective A reements. 11 
Honthly Labor Review. v. 7 ·, No. 5, !--fay 19 2, 
pp . 555- 559 
V. Personal Sources of Information 
35. dvisory to Union Repr esent a t ive s Who ~·fay Be 
Called Upon to Defend the UAW Guaranteed Empl oy-
ment Plan. (Unpublished) 1955. 
